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Introduction

In 62 7 CE, a nomadic army exploded through the Caspian Gates and into the
northernmost lands of the Sasanian Empire (in present day Dagestan and Azerbaijan). Our
principal historian, Movses Dasxuranc'i (also called Movses Kagankatvac'i) calls them Khazars,
and he may well be correct. 1 But they were certainly a part of the Western Turkic KJ1aganate,
invading at the behest of the great TongYabghu Khagan. According to Movses, the attack was
exceedingly brutal, with the Turks, in their "universal wrath," slaughtering men. women, and
children "like shameless and ravenous wolves." 2 This was no random attack. It was the opening
salvo of a grand invasion, planned in concert by the Roman forces of Emperor Hcraclius. In
time, this invasion would reverse the course of the brutal war between the Romans and
Sasanians, allowing the Romans to reclaim their eastern provinces, for all the good that would do
them. After all, shortly afterwards would come another nomadic invasion from the south,
ushering in the Caliphates of the Arabs.
The seventh century is among the most pivotal in human history, and the Near East, the
crucible of the new Islamic world, has attracted a great deal of study. However, an important
player in the drama has too often been ignored - the First Turkic Kllaganatc. Though the First
Turkic Khaganate lasted less than a century, its impact on the Eurasian Steppes, especially those
west of the Altai Mountains, was enormous. It is no coincidence these steppes (including modern
Central Asia, Southern Russia, and Ukraine) still contain many Turkic-speaking inhabitants.
Thus, it is rather unsurprising that this period has attracted its fair share of scholarship,
particularly from a philological perspective. As yet, however, most of it has remained separate

Moses, History, 2.11; for further examination of the relation between these "Khazars" and the Khaganate. see
below.
2 Movses, History, 2.11.
1
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from historical approaches to the sixth and seventh century Near East, despite the clear historical
significance of the Turks. There is still a great deal of debate within the scholarship about the
East-West partition of the First Khaganate, which will be explored below. But with or without
the support of their Eastern cohorts, the Western Khaganate was more than powerful enough to
be an effective Roman ally. For the first time, there was a centralized confederation on the
Pontic-Caspian steppes - comparable to those which had existed along the borders of China and
Persia. That unprecedented expansion west primed the pump for the greatest revolution of all:
the establishment of diplomacy with the Roman Empire.
This alliance bore its greatest fruit in the joint invasion of the Sasanian Empire, but its
roots stretch back much further, practically to the moment the Turks arrived on the western
steppes. Put simply, the Turks and Romans had a common enemy in the Sasanians. The benefit
of an alliance was obvious from the very beginning. The realization of it was not. Certainly,
there were a great many embassies and nigh-constant diplomatic chicaneries. However, the
simple fact remains that there is no evidence of any military alliance before that fateful attack of
627. If the benefit of an alliance was so clear, then what could be the explanation for its failure to
become reality before the seventh century?
To answer this question, a coherent and comprehensible narrative of Turco-Roman
relations must first be constructed, beginning with their arrival on the western steppes c. 552 CE
and ending with the collapse of the First Khaganate c. 650. The sixth century world that the
Turks arrived was dominated by the Romans and Sasanians, and since the reign of Anastasius.
Into that powder keg strode a fully formed Turkic empire, intent on carving out its place in what
once were Sasanian-dominatcd regions. The first emperor to seize the opportunity this presented
was Justin II, whose mission to the Western Turks met with qualified success, although without
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an alliance. But after .Justin's reign, Turco-Roman relations soured, reaching a nadir marked by
failed embassies and raids on Roman holdings. This state of affairs did not change until the 620s,
when the alliance was finally cemented by Heraclius to great success, before the Tang and Arab
conquests changed everything.
A few key points emerge again and again from this narrative. First is the continued
insistence of the Turkic Khaganate on being treated as an equal empire to the Romans and
Sasanians. Perhaps even more remarkable is their success in achieving the closest thing to that
acknowledgment the Romans were willing to give, if even for the briefest of moments. The
second, closely related point is the high level of diplomatic sophistication evinced by the
Khaganate in interacting with the Romans. Given that the Turks cut their teeth interacting with
Chinese civilization, this should not be terribly surprising. Still, it is remarkable and clearly came
as a surprise to the Romans. That sophistication is useful, considering the third point: the clear
expansionist agenda of the Turkic Khaganate. It would be absurd to suggest that there was any
complete grand strategy on the minds of the Kl1agans. However, their obsessions and general
aims remain remarkably similar over the timespan - impressive for a characteristically unstable
and civil war-prone nomadic empire.
The fourth combines the prior three in stating that the Western Kbaganate was
unprecedented. Certainly, steppe nomads had played an ever-present role in the Greco-Roman
oikumene, from Scythians and Sarrnatians to Huns. But none ever matched the same level of
sophistication and centralization that the Turks brought to the west. They were every bit the
equals of the great settled states, with goals and the ability to achieve them. The only fitting
comparison is the Xiongnu, with whom the Romans did not interact in a meaningful capacity. In
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itself, the uniqueness of the Turks is worthy of note, but when combined with the importance of
the time period it becomes even more pivotal to understand.
The diplomatic interplay between the Romans and Turks was an ever-present factor in
the Near East from c. 552 to c. 650, and their alliance played a pivotal role in constructing the
settlement which would be toppled by the Muslims shortly thereafter. Thus, the Turkic
Khaganate stands at the crossroads of history, worthy of a far greater attention than they are
routinely given. In charting their evolving relationship with the Roman Empire, one can see the
roots of the world that comes after - the cunning, Byzantine diplomacy, the prevalence of steppe
peoples, and the closer integration of the western steppes with the soon to be Islamic Near
Eastern world. That world would be inconceivable without the ebb and flow of Turco-Roman
relations.
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Methodology and Historiography
A reconstructed narrative of the Turco-Roman alliance is not untrod ground. Among the
most detailed is that of Harry Turtledove· s 1977 account, which focuses on the first phase of the
alliance under Justin II and Tiberius. Unfortunately, its age puts it at a substantial disadvantage,
as it does not account for many of the developments in both Roman and Inner Asian scholarship
over the intervening 44 years. Compounding that issue (and emblematic of its date), Turtledove
is exclusively reliant on written sources and tends to let himself be led by their biases, most
evident in his uncritical acceptance of Menander Protector's topoi-ridd!ed portrayal of
Tourxanthos. 3 His ultimate conclusion, that the alliance with the Turks "more trouble than it was
worth," merely another one of Justin's "'follies," is built on these unsteady foundations, and must
be reappraised. 4 And, most fundamentally, Turtledove is working solely from a Roman
perspective and thus evaluates only the Roman perception of it.
Fortunately, however, there have also been complimentary approaches from the opposite
direction, that is, examining the Turco-Roman alliance from the Turkic perspective. The most
notable are those presented in Peter Golden's Introduction to the History of'the Turkic Peoples
and Denis Sinor's "Establishment and Dissolution of'the Turk Empire." Sinor's piece remains
the best coherent narrative available, however, he is hampered by many interpretational
eccentricities - most notably in his steadfast refusal to match Greek renderings of Turkic names
with logical counterparts, often resulting in claims that the Romans were negotiating with
underlings, not Khagans. 5 This results in an unnecessary weakening of the diplomatic contacts

3

Harry Turtledove, "The Immediate Successors of Justinian." (PhD Diss., University of California, Los Angeles,
1977), 162-165.
4 Turtledove, "Immediate Successors," 166-68.
5 Denis Sinor, "The Establishment and Dissolution of the Turk Empire," in The Cambridge History of Ea riv Inner
Asia, ed.Denis Sinor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 301-05, 308-10 ..
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between Turks and Romans and is frankly unsupported by the evidence. Much of this is
corrected by the brilliant linguistic detective work of Golden, who gives the most reliable set of
reconstructed personages available. 6 Unfortunately, botb have the same weakness, namely their
being rather short. As a result, both rely on summary and generalization. There is considerable
room for expansion on the themes and ideas that they develop, especially when integrated more
fully with Roman scholarship.
As with any treatment of diplomatic history, the foundation of this study must come from
the written sources. When dealing witb the late sixth and early seventh centuries, this
necessitates the reliance on a smattering of mostly fragmentary evidence. Fortunately, despite the
paucity, what written sources we do have focus on diplomacy to a degree unusual in ancient and
medieval history-writing. In part, this can be attributed to many being preserved in the
compilations of Constantine Porphyrogenitus, but not all of the sources are found there, and
indeed many are not even Greek. Thus, we should rather take the emphasis on diplomacy in the
extant sources as a reflection of the times - times in which the intricate diplomatic negotiations
of the great empires were rightly considered centrally important to the broader history.
Unsurprisingly, most of our sources from the Roman perspective are written in Greek,
although it would be reductive and misleading to simply group these together. In fact, the Greek
historical tradition of the period contains two distinct bodies of history. The first and most
directly applicable to diplomatic history is the classicizing tradition embodied by writers such as
Menander Protector and Theophylact Simocatta. Writing in a strict tradition stretching as far
back as Thucydides, these historians emphasize state-level warfare, external diplomacy, and
above all the actions of important individuals. Despite the obvious limitations of such an

6

Peter Golden, An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, l 992), 127-131, 135.
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approach, it is these sources that provide us with reliable, foundational insight into diplomatic
negotiations, owing to the authors' proximity to the imperial court. 7 On the other hand are the
ecclesiastical historians, much more numerous and often anonymous or pseudonymous. These
histories obviously focus more on the affairs of the church, but such a focus entails a bottom-up
perspective and a localized history that can often fill the gaps left by the broader classicizing
histories.
Most non-Greek sources of the Near East, coming from the Armenian and Syriac
traditions, fall into the latter category. These sources become particularly crucial later, as the
Greek tradition shrinks. However, even from the beginning, they provide an altogether unique
insight into the arena of the Near East, often being more direct witnesses than Greek-writers to
the effects of diplomatic ebb-and-flow (as was the aforementioned case with Movses
Kagankatvac'i). Oftentimes, the proximity to the frontiers ensured that these writers had a closer
proximity to the Turks and a greater understanding of steppe nomads in general, a fact that, when
combined with the lessened reliance on classical topoi, can render them more reliable than Greek
writers.
On the subject of the Turks, the written sources applicable to them are ofa rather
different nature. Unfortunately for posterity, this era's Turks lacked a writing system, with the
first epigraphic evidence appearing in the eighth century and manuscripts coming even later. 8 As
shall be demonstrated, the period of these writings is markedly different from the period here
covered - so much so that retrojecting these later sources must be done cautiously, provisionally,

7

For examples of this proximity, see the biographical treatments in Menander the Guardsman, The Histo1y qf
Mcnandff the Guardsman, trans. R. C. Blocklcy (Trowbridge, 'Wiltshire: Francis Cairns, 1985), l -5; and
Theophylact Simocatta The J!isto1y of Theophylacl Simocatla, trans. Michael Whtiby and Mary Whitby (Oxford:
Clarendon Press. 1986), xiii-xvii.
8 For a concise overview of written Early Turkic, see Golden, Introduction, 151-52.
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and always with a great deal of supporting evidence. It would be foolish to deny that the lack of
written evidence is a problem. We will never hear the Turks of this period truly speak in their
own voice. However, a careful examination of external sources can mitigate this problem
somewhat. Particularly noteworthy here are the Chinese sources, especially those of the so-called
·'Standard Histories'' compiled in the Tang period. which arc generally very concerned with the
Turks. 9 Like the classicizing Greek sources, the Chinese ··Standard" or "Orthodox" tradition is a
very old tradition that docs not lack for topoi and limited perspective. But they provide an
unmatched insight into Turkic internal politics and tell another half of the story of Turkic
diplomacy with settled peoples.
Crucially, however, these written sources cannot and will not be considered in a vacuum.
The archaeological record is of extensive usefulness in supplementing and verifying surviving
writings. Clearly, archaeology can tell us nothing about the discussions between Roman and
Turkic envoys. However, it can tell us a great deal about what they referred to. Archaeology
becomes exceedingly important when reconstructing the Turks' culture and history, given the
lack of textual evidence. So too does the distribution of Turkic and Sasanian coins allow for a
speculative reconstruction of the changes on the Sasanians' eastern frontier. Numismatic
evidence is also particularly revelatory in uncovering the Turks presentation of their universalist
ideology and worldview ~ necessary additions to the rather limited perspective of our written
sources. In tum, the written sources imbue archaeology and numismatics with a context and
meaning than they would otherwise lack. As such, the synthesis of these two disparate elements
can give us a much fuller view of Turco-Roman relations.

9

Endymion Porter Wilkinson, Chinese Histo1)': A New ll1anual (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000),

818-26.
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That spirit of synthesis applies equally to this work's treatment of the historiography- or,
more accurately, historiographies. Turco-Roman history is truly Eurasian, taken together, the
two empires stretch from Spain to Korea. As such, any work that claims to construct a
comprehensive narrative of their relations will need to integrate a substantial number of
historiographies from across the Eurasian continent(s). With that said, given their centrality to
the topic, a few must be given an especial focus. The first is the historiography of the Later
Roman Empire. There is certainly no lack of historical writing on the Late Roman and Byzantine
world, in spite of the relative dearth of evidence. Indeed, diplomatic history has become
increasingly prevalent, often with a particular focus on diplomacy and Roman-Sasanian
relations. 10
However, rarely are Turco-Roman relations highlighted as being of particular import in
this period, an error that the present work seeks to rectify. Often, they are given a cursory
mention, lacking sufficient explanation of their importance. For example, Dignas and Winter's
discussion of the Turks simply states that Justin II attempted to secure an alliance with them and
moves on, further mentioning the Turks only as a distraction for the Sasanians. 11 The later Turkic
alliance (or "'Chazar" alliance, as they follow Movses and other sources with that incomplete
identification) is mentioned only in passing, not as a decisive factor in the last great war of
antiquity. 12 Indeed, it is quite rare to see the alliance considered such. The great exception is
James Howard-Johnston, who (owing to his familiarity with Annenian sources like Movses) has
long championed the Turks as among the deciding factors in the Roman victory. 13 His

10

See e.g., The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars, Part II: AD 363-630 ed. Geoffrey Greatrex and
Samuel N.C. Lieu (London: Routledge, 2002); Beate Dignas and Engelbert Winter, Rome and Persia in Late
Antiquity: Neighbars and Rivals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
11
Dignas and Winter, Rome and Persia, 41-42.
12
Dignas and Winter, Rome and Persia, 46.
1
~ James Howard-Johnston, ''Heraclius' Persian Campaigns and the Revival of the East Roman Empire.'' War in
Histo,y 6 (1999): 40-42.
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argumentation is very convincing and closely examined below, but it can be expanded and given
a great deal of additional context when synthesized with the full history of Turco-Roman
relations behind it.
The second body of scholarship is, naturally, the that which studies the Turkic Khaganate
itself. Again, there is no dearth ofresearch on this topic (although it is perhaps less well-known
than Later Roman history). Mostly, however, the work is being done from a philological
perspective, rather than a historical one concerned with constructed nanatives. That approach has
been exceedingly fruitful and has led to some excellent scholarship that is absolutely
foundational for this work. For example, Michael R. Drompp's work in this area has provided as
thorough an understanding of internal Turkic affairs as can be expected, a necessity when
accounting for their motivations in diplomacy. 14 However, this hyper-focus often comes at the
expense of larger-scale, diachronic historical events such as diplomatic nanative.
There are exceptions to the specificity, but often they are surveys which cannot afford to
thoroughly examine a specific topic such as Turco-Roman diplomacy. 15 Very often, these works
place the First Turkic Khaganate within the broader realm of Inner Asian History (that is,
principally, the history of China's northern frontier). as Barfield does in defining the Turks in
terms of their relationship with China. 16 That approach is reasonable, valid, and has proven
highly fecund. However, this work takes a different tack, in examining the First Turkic
Khaganate's affairs outside the Inner Asian heartlands and as a player in world history, using the
same methods that have been used in examining Turkic relations with China. In so doing, it

14

Michael R. Drompp, Supernumerary Sovereigns: Superfluidity and Mutability in the Elite Power Structure of the
Early Turks (Tu-jue)," in Rulers from the Steppe: State Formation on the Eurasian Periphe1y, eds. Gary Seaman
and Daniel Marks (Los Angeles: Ethnographics Press, University of Southern California, 1991), 44-115; and
Michael R. Drompp, "Imperial State Formation in Inner Asia: The Early Turkic Empires (6th to 9th Centuries),"
Acta Orienta/ia Academia Scientarum Hungaricae 58 (2005): 101-11.
15
Golden, Introduction is a prominent example.
16
Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier (Cambridge, MA Basil Blackwell, 1989), 85-127.
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hopes to add to the understanding of Turkic and Inner Asian history as well. The relationship
with the Romans was crucial to the western part of the Khaganate, and a more thorough
understanding thereof holds the promise of better explaining this more enigmatic half.
The revised approach of this work was decisively influenced by the third major
historiob>raphy, that of the Sasanians. In recent times, Sasanian historiography has been swept by
a "reorientation" of the Sasanian world east, emphasizing the importance of the Eastern frontier
to an equal if not greater degree than the better-documented Western (Roman) one. 17 Naturally,
this would imply a greater level of significance for the Turkic Khaganate in Sasanian affairs than
has often been regarded by more Western-centric histories. However, even here, many scholars
have not fully accounted for the importance of the Turks. Parvaneh Pourshariati, in her otherwise
excellent Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire, largely ignores the Turks in explaining the
Sasanians' demise. 18 Her thesis focuses, convincingly, on the internal collapse of the ParthianSasanian confederacy. 19 But she unfortunately neglects to account for the presence of an external
stressor- namely the Turks - who played a major role in fomenting the collapse of the
confederacy she describes.
Despite the many wonderful advances they have made, all three of these historiographies
have significant flaws in their treatment of Turco-Roman relations. At the root of the flaws is the
lack of significant contact between the works of scholars in these ostensibly separate worlds. The
Turco-Roman alliance, at the nexus point of all three, represents a singularly important case in

17

See, e.g., Khodadad Rezakhani, ReOrienting the Sasanians: East Iran in Late Antiquity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2017); Sasanian Persia: Betiveen Rome and the Steppes of Eurasia ed. Eberhard Sauer
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019): Richard Payne. "The Making ofTuran: The Fall and
Transformation of the Iranian East in Late Antiquity," Journal of Late Antiquity 9 (2016): 4-41: and Parvaneh
Pourshariati, Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire: The Sasanian-Parthian Confederacy and the Arab Conquest
of Iran (London: LB. Tauris, 2017), the latter of which has an extensive bibliography of Sasanian historiography.
18 The only major coverage of Turks comes with her account ofBahram Chobin, Pourshariati, Decline and Fall,
400-410.
19
Pourshariati, Decline and Fall, 2-6.
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which they must work in tandem. Thus, a new, thoroughgoing account of the Turco Roman
alliance, as this work aspires to be, necessitates an assimilation of these disparate works.
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Section One: The Roman "Status Quo" of the Mid-6 1" Century
In order to understand Turco-Roman relations, it is vital to first establish the status quo the scene which the Turks burst into when they sent a delegation to Constantinople in 563. The
only problem with this is that the 6th century is one of the most dynamic and fluid periods in
Roman history, in addition to being fairly well-documented (at least compared to the 5th and 7th )_
As such, any attempt to summarize the events and draw out general trends and themes will
necessarily only scratch the surface. Thus, what follows is only intended as a primer prior to the
narrative of Turco-Roman diplomacy, with an especial focus on those elements which will be
relevant to the development thereof.
The arrival of the Turks on the Western Steppes corresponds with the terminal period of
the reign of Justinian, a period which Michael Maas rather prosaically describes as
"disappointing. "

20

In a peripeteia worthy of Herodotus, the whole world seemed to tum against

the regime. Perhaps the most devastating event was the much-discussed plague outbreak of 542,
which wreaked havoc on the Roman economy and paralyzed the empire by infecting Justinian
himself.

21

Equally devastating on a personal and political level was the death of Theodora in 548.

It is doubtful that the 548-49 conspiracy of Artabanes and his allies (in which a number of

Byzantine and Armenian aristocrats plotted to replace Justinian with his cousin Gerrnanos) was
unrelated to these weaknesses. Though as Procopius himself admits, the plot "came to
nothing,'m it serves as an illustration of the cracking foundation of the Justinianic settlement. It

20

Michael Maas, '"Roman Questions, Byzantine Answers: Contours of the Age of Justinian." in The Cambridge
Companion to the Age of Justinian, ed. Michael Maas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 9-10.

21

Much has been written on the plague itself and its consequences. For a good overview, see Peregrine Harden
"Mediterranean Plague in the Age of Justinian" in The Cambridge Companion, 134-160: for a catastrophist
argument for the continuing importance of the plague throughout Late Antiquity, see Plague and the End<~(
Antiquity ed. Lester K. Little (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
n Procopius, Wars, 7 .31.
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is telling that this is the first major challenge to Justinian's rule mentioned by Procopius since the
Nika Riots of some seventeen years earlier. The 550s continued tbc trend with an unremitting
barrage of natural disasters. In an almost painfully poetic moment, the very dome of the Hagia
Sophia, which Peter N. Bell has aptly called "ideology in stone," 23 cracked and eventually
collapsed in 557, according to John Malalas. 24
However, it is important not to overstate the bleakness of this period. One must not
simply take Procopius at face value, particularly when he claims that a trillion people were killed
by Justinian's policy in the same breath. 25 Even the plague, as devastating as it was, was
probably not the absolute demographic tailspin our written sources might imply. 26 The Roman
Empire was still the dominant power and Constantinople was still the navel of the world.
Particularly from an outside perspective, an alliance with Rome was an incredibly attractive
option.
Still, Justinian's western affairs, once the pride of his propaganda machine, had indeed
soured. Agathias accuses Justinian of having '"wearied of vigorous policies" in his old age and of
allowing the legions to degrade. 27 Equally likely, however, was that the nigh constant warfare
and expansion had sapped the empire itself of strength. The wars with the barbarian kingdoms of
the west turned against the Romans, with the desultory warfare in Italy a particularly grisly
example. Most strikingly, at least for Agathias, a combined Hun-Slavic raiding party reached the
walls of Constantinople, defeated only by Belisarius' emergence from retiremcnt. 28 But the most

23

Peter N. Bell, Social Conflict in the Age of Justinian: Its Nature Management and Mediation (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 319.
24
John Malalas, Chronicle, 18,489.
25 Procop. Secret History, 18.
26 For a revisionist reading relying particularly on archaeology and DNA, see Lee Mordechai and Merle Eisenberg,
1
"Rejecting Catastrophe: The Case of the Justinianic Plague," Past & Present 244 (2019): 3-50.
27 Agath. 5.14. 1.
28 As narrated in Agath. 5.15-20.
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relevant event to the present discussion is the coming of the A vars to the Roman periphery after
fleeing the rising Turkic power in the east. 29 Though they may not have known it at the time, this
marks the first connection between the Turkic Khaganate and the Roman Empire.
The best account of their arrival comes from Menander Protector. The Avars arrived
among the Caucasian Alans sometime in the late 550s. 30 Almost immediately, the A vars sent an
envoy to Constantinople, demanding "the most valuable gifts, yearly payments, and very fertile
land to inhabit" in order to render the ·•invincible" A vars "well-disposed'' to the Romans. 31 In
accordance with his earlier policy, 32 Justinian agreed to these requests, rather than facing the
hostilities of yet another barbarian tribe. Presumably, the gifts were easy enough to manage; the
real issue was the land. Justinian attempted to settle the A vars in Pannonia Secunda (roughly the
northern part of modem Serbia), probably aiming to play them against the Gepids of the
Pannonian Plain, as Blockley intelligently notes. 33 Indeed, Menander praises Justinian for
similarly using them to "crush'' the other tribes of the region on their way from Alania to the
Danube. 34
All was not well, however, and the abortive alliance broke down. Menander attributes
this breakdown to a personal conference between an A var envoy and the Byzantine official
revealing A var treachery, 35 although one suspects that this is a classic case of a Greek historian
reducing broader issues to an individual level. Certainly, Menander also mentions that the A vars

29

See Below, Section Two.
There exists some debate over the dating. Compare the dating of 557/8 given in Walter Pohl. The Avars. A Steppe
Empire in Central Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018), 21-23; against the 559/60 dating given m
R.C. Blackley, The History of Menander the Guardsman (Liverpool: Francis Cairns, 1985), 252-53, n. 19. The
difference is somewhat trivial for the present discussion, so I shall avoid presenting a specific year(s).
11 Men. Prat. Fr. 5,1.
.n Cf. the settling of the Lombards in Procop. Wars, 7.34, for example.
33 Blackley, History, 253, n. 28.
34 Men. Prat. Fr. 5,2.
35
Men. Prot. Fr. 5,4.
19
·
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were dissatisfied with the land offer, preferring a location in Scythia Minor (roughly
corresponding with modern Dobruja in Romania and Bulgaria) which was rejected by the
Romans. 36 Perhaps this disagreement spoiled the alliance. In any case, the alliance collapsed, and
Justinian held the A var envoys as hostages to ensure their remaining north of the Danube. From
here on, the A vars remained a liquid, hostile factor on the northwest frontier, until eventually
coming to rest on the Pannonian Plain after the removal of the Gepids and migration of the
Lombards. 37
Several conclusions can be drawn from the Romans' interactions with the A vars. Many
are quite general; Walter Pohl correctly notes that the Romans' "procedure was in no way
exceptional." 38 Thus, the example of the A vars can be used to draw larger conclusions about
Roman-Steppe people relations. While there was certainly no prescribed policy towards Steppe
peoples, the Romans nonetheless fell back on a number of stratagems when it came to dealing
with them. First and foremost was the tendency to play them off each other, in the hopes that
doing so would distract from raids on Roman territory and prevent the formation of a larger
polity. As a further part of this management, the Romans were highly concerned with controlling
the movements of these nomadic groups, often attempting to settle them in particular areas
conducive to Roman interest.
Equally important, however, is the fact that these stratagems very often failed, as they did
in the case of the Avars. Rather than managing the frontier. Justinian's policies ultimately
resulted in the creation of an A var Empire in Pannonia - a genuine existential threat to the
empire - although his death spared him from dealing with the consequences. Nevertheless, the

16
37
38

Men. Prat. Fr. 5,4; For the identification of Menander's vague Scythia Minor, see Blackley, Histo,y, 253, n. 28.
For a much more detailed account of the Avars in this period see Pohl, A vars, 21-68.
Pohl, A vars, 22.

••••~••-,,"""s--•

Melvin 18
Romans will draw from the same playbook when dealing with the Turks, although with very
different results. More particularly, in dealing with the Avars, the Romans had unwittingly
poisoned relations with the Turkic Khaganate before negotiations had even be6'Un.
It is very difficult to spin the developments western frontier as good. The East, however,
was far more ambivalent. The so-called Eternal Peace, signed with the Sasanians in 532, had
lasted scarcely eight years. In the summer of 540, the Sasanians invaded Roman Mesopotamia.
Procopius attributes the breakdown to the conniving of a Gothic king, 39 but the account of a
similar near-war caused by a dispute among Arabs makes it seem as though Khusro was spoiling
for an excuse to war with the now-distracted Romans. 40 Initially, that war was indeed disastrous
for the Romans, with the sacking of Antioch a particularly damaging blow. 41 However, the war
quite quickly turned desultory; despite constant fighting, neither side could gain the decisive
advantage. By 545, a truce was signed on the Mesopotamian front, although the war would
continue on in Lazica well into the 550s. Finally, a full truce was signed in 557.
The negotiations for a forn1al peace carried on until 562. Fortunately, a thorough account
of that treaty survives in Menander Protector. Central to the treaty is the resolving the disputes
throughout the frontier, most notably the fortifications at Daras, which the Persians "shall not
complain to the Romans about," although the Romans were not allowed to station "a large force.
beyond what is adequate to the town." 42 Most relevant to Turkic diplomacy, the treaty also
concerns the movement of traders and merchants across the borders. Crucially, that control of
movement equally applies to "barbarian merchants of either state" who "shall not travel by
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strange roads but shall go by Nisibis and Daras." 43 By this provision, trade envoys from, say, the
Turkic Khaganate, should have to pass through the entrcp6ts on the Roman-Sasanian border.
Failure to do so would violate the tcnns of the peace.

It is easy to discount the peace of 562, given that it collapses only ten years later. But it
was not simply a piece of paper that both sides planned to disregard the moment a war became
advantageous again. As pointed out by Dignas and Winter, the peace of 562 "was a serious
attempt to find a comprehensive solution to all controversial topics. '' 44 There was even a
provision that gave a complicated process for resolving the sort of border community disputes
that are used by "godless men ... [to] provide a pretext for war.'' 45 In order to ensure clarity and
avoid misinterpretation, a team of twelve interpreters were assigned to review the translation. 46
All signs point to the fact that this treaty was intended to last for the fifty years it stipulated. As
such, it comes the closest to being the elusive "status quo" for the mid-6 th century. That status
quo was one of considerable parity between the Romans and Sasanians. The treaty of 562 is
clearly a negotiation between two powers on an even par. One year later, the first Turkic
delegation would arrive in Constantinople.
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Section Two: The Coming of the Turkic Khaganate

The Turks first enter the historical record in the mid-sixth century. Presumably, of course,
they preexisted this for some time - and much ink has been spilled in determining their origins
and Urheimat; as Peter Golden notes, it remains an open question. 47 We can be fairly confident
in saying that they were ironworkers (a fact which will become important in their gift-giving)
and that they were among the most prominent vassals of their predecessor empire, the Rouran
Khaganate; these two factors are likely related, given the importance of iron to warfare. 48
Practically everything else is up for debate. It may well be, as Golden speculates, that the true
ethnogenesis of the Turks came only with the process ofstate-fonnation- certainly, this would
not be unique in Inner Asian history. 49
In any case, the leaders of the Turks were the Ashina Clan and the first member of the
clan reported in history is Bumin. Under Bumin, the Turks played a leading role in suppressing
the internal dissent plaguing the collapsing Rouran Khaganate then under the rulership of Anagui
(r. 520-552). According to the Chinese sources, Bumin broke out in revolt from his liege when
Anagui refused his request for a royal marriage alliance. 50 One learns to be skeptical of this sort
of personalization in ancient sources, both Chinese and Classical, but the singular importance of
marriage-alliances in Inner Asian societies makes it far from impossible. Demonstrative of that
fact is the marriage ofBumin to a princess of the Western Wei 51 shortly thereafter. Utilizing the
alliance with the Wei and the weaknesses of the Rouran state, Bumin quickly defeated the
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Rouran and rose to supremacy over their lands by 552. Unfortunately for him, he died shortly
thereafter.
Roughly contemporary with the death of Bumin, his brother, Ishtemi, began a push into
the west. Though the sources report that he was following the fleeing Rouran, 52 it is a reasonable
surmise that he was also motivated by economic factors, given that the west (particularly the
region now known as Turkestan - not to be confused with its subdivision, Turkmenistan)
contained the main urban centers of the silk trade. 53 Whatever the reason, this was a remarkable
decision. Prior empires, like the Xiongnu, had developed influence in Turkestan, often extracting
revenue from local merchant princes. 54 But they had never directly controlled the western
regions; the Turks were the first, and only the Mongols would repeat it. In so doing, Ishtemi put
the Turks into direct contact with the Roman Empire, and he is likely the Silziboulos mentioned
in the first mission to Constantinople. 55
However, the expansion of the Turkic Khaganate was soon met by the dominant power
already in the region - the Hephthalites. The Hephthalites were themselves a nomadic Inner
Asian people, who had built a powerful, Bactrian-centered empire on the eastern borders of Iran
and extending as far east as the Tarim Basin. 56 Fortunately for the Turks, they found a powerful
ally in a Sasanian Iran under the leadership of Khosrow I Anushirvan - among the most
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mythologized and celebrated of all Iranian rulers. It is thus unsurprising that, as Touraj Daryaee
notes, "it is quite difficult to determine fact from fiction'' in his rule. 57 This fact is well-reflected
in the evidence of the Turco-Sasanian alliance. The sources are unanimous in reporting this antiHephthalite coalition, but our most detailed account comes from the Shahnameh. Certainly, the
source is not without its problems, not least of which is in identifying the Turks as "Chinese,"
although the events and name Sinjibu (Ishtemi) clearly mark them as the Western Turks. 58
However, it more than makes up for its deficiencies in the insights a careful reading could offer.
According to the Shahnameh, war broke out between the Turks and Hephthalites when
the Hephthalites murdered a Turk ambassador bound for Iran. lfthis is indeed true, it would be a
remarkable demonstration of the proactivity of Turkic diplomacy. Given the fact that we know
from Menander Protector that the Turks also initiated contact with the Romans, the idea that they
would do the same with the Sasanians is reasonable. It is equally intriguing that the Turks
proceeded to war without securing that alliance. Far from the hammer-and-anvil, two-front
strategy often presented in the literature, the Turks defeated the Hephthalites on their own at the
Battle of Gol-Zarriun and had even reached a peace agreement. It was only after this victory that
the Sasanians brought forces into the region, whereupon the Turks beseeched them for an
alliance, cemented with the exchange of royal brides. The boundary line seems to have been the
Oxus. The Shahnameh is explicit in stating that Ishtemi saw his daughter only to the Oxus, 59 but
this could be taken as mere poetic license were it not for solid archaeological evidence for
Sasanian occupation up to the Oxus and no further. 60
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This is a fine story, evinced by its inclusion in the Shahnameh, but it also tells us a great
deal about Turkic diplomacy more broadly. First, the Turks are the agents in initiating diplomacy
- a role which they will continue to play with the Roman Empire and had already played with the
Wei. Second is the imp011ance of marriage alliances and gift giving as tools of diplomacy,
which, again, was visible with the Wei. Both were basic aspects of Turkic diplomatic language
and the diplomatic language of Late Antique Eurasia more broadly, although the Romans will
not lack for hang-ups about the fonncr. Third, the Turks defeated the Hcphthalites alone and
aligned with the Sasanians only for the cleanup operation in partitioning the Hephthalite empire.
That might suggest something that might be reinforced by their earlier conduct. Rather than the
expected explanation of the alliance as a military function, necessary to defeat an equal or
superior foe, the Turks used alliances to build a frontier settlement after the main events of the
war - a pattern which will reappear.
Of course, as soon as the Hephthalites were reduced into rump principalities, the
Sasanian-Turkic accord collapsed. Their alliance was built on a common enemy, and now that
the Turks had come to occupy the same space, the two were natural enemies (although one
wonders what the respective royal brides thought of it). More precise narrative detail will be
given below, but it suffices for our purpose here to say that after a brief defeat, the Turks pushed
into the lands south of the Oxus up to the Iranian Plateau. 61 Certainly by about 580, the Western
Turkic Khaganatc was established in the shape it would hold until the Tang invasion.
But the Hephthalites were far from the only major conquest of this early period. The
Turks also pushed much further west, into the heartlands of the Pantie-Caspian Steppe. Owing to
the paucity of evidence - both documentary and archaeological - left in this region, it is
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impossible to establish dates or events with any precision. However, what is clear is that the
Turks had established their rule over the Volga regions (with admittedly some resistance) by
about 571, giving us a terminus ante quern with which to work. 62 As we already know that the
A vars, expelled by and fleeing the advance of the Turks came onto the Pantie-Caspian steppe by
558 at the earliest, we can establish that as a terminus post quern.
However, in addressing this issue of the Avars, we have stumbled into one of the great
questions of the historiography, which cannot go unaddressed here, seeing as "the Avar
problem" will be among the defining issues in Turco-Roman diplomacy. Put simply, the question
is: were the Avars who appear in the Caucasus the same as the Rouran ovetihrown by the Turks?
Certainly, the name A var and its variations were applied to the Rourans, 63 and the pattern of an
overthrown elite migrating west is one well-established in the Inner Asian tradition. So it should
be an easy answer, but it is complicated by the testimony ofTheophylact Simocatta. Probably
acting upon information given by the Turks themselves, Theophylact reports that the people
known to the West as Avars are in fact Pseudo-A vars, wholly different peoples, called the Vara
and Chunni, who had stolen the name from the prior overlords of the Turks. 64 It would be easy to
dismiss the excursus out of hand, the product of a negative animus to the A vars at the time of
their siege of Constantinople, but, as Walter Pohl points out, his infonnation is far too good to
dismiss whole cloth. 65
Regardless, the tendency has been to disregard Theophylact's account, given the
preponderance oflinguistic evidence. In the words of Peter Golden, the leading scholar in the
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field of early Turkic history, "the 'Pseudo-A vars' may be safely removed from historical
analysis."

66

However, scholars like Etienne de la Vaissiere and Walter Pohl have rightly

modified that argument to include the likelihood that there were indeed non-Rouran elements in
the Avars. For one thing, the archaeology does not match, although material culture is not
necessarily the best predicter. 67 More importantly, we also have reports from the Chinese sources
that the ruling Rourans actually came to China, rather than launching into a mad dash for tcrra
incognita.
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The most likely explanation to account for all of these discrepancies is that the A vars

were in fact an amalgam of many disenfranchised groups, including some remnants of the
Rouran, who took the most prestigious name among them. 69 Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity,
"A vars'' will here refer only to those people who came to rest in Pannonia and "Rouran" to the
Inner Asian Khaganate.
Perhaps most interesting, for our purposes, is the fact that it was the Turks themselves
who actually caused this whole mess. In their many, many complaints to the Romans about the
A vars, the Turks do not refer to them as Rouran, but U arkhonitai, the name which Theophylact
uses as a premise for his excursus. 70 The A vars are not framed to the Romans as the former
rulers of the Turks, but as their slaves, some among the many slave tribes subject to the Khagan.
When lshtemi boasts that he shall follow them, he does so not to avenge their former subjugation
of the Turks, but out of outrage that his rightful subjects have left. 71 There are thus two
possibilities: either the Turks did not consider the A vars to be the same as the Rouran, or they
had a reason to present to the Romans otherwise. It could merely be the case that to admit that
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they were fonnally subject people would undermine their perceived power. But in any case, the
Turks' lack of acknowledgement of the Rouran-Avar connection lets some air out of the theory
that their primary motivation was the pursuit of the Rouran.
Regardless of their motives, the Turks had created a genuine Eurasian empire,
unchallenged in its scope until the Mongols. What was the Turkic state, so quickly able to
become a great power? As is almost always the case, understanding the foreign affairs of the
Turkic Khaganate is impossible without knowing its domestic ones. If anything, the necessity is
even b>reater with the Turks, as diplomacy is itself a key aspect of their political system. It is thus
fortunate that we have relatively solid evidence for Turkic statecraft and even more fortunate that
state formation and maintenance is probably the second most widely discussed and debated issue
in the historiography, after ethnogenesis.
Of course, there is another side to that coin - there is a considerable amount of
controversy surrounding the Turkic state and Inner Asian statecraft more broadly. Ever since the
pioneering writings of Owen Lattimore, the focus of such discussion has been on economics.
Lattimore famously defined the Inner Asia-China border more by economic and ecological
differences than the power of a given state. 72 While Lattimore himself did not apply his principle
to state-building, Thomas J. Barfield has. On this reading, the nomadic economy is dependent on
the settled goods available in a powerful, unified China, states and empires are formed as
supratribal units designed to better extract resources from settled peoples - ·'shadow empires·• as
Barfield called them. 73 That is to say, that the impetus of nomadic (and indeed Barfield suggests
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this is also true of non-Inner Asian nomads) comes from external, not internal factors. 74 The
Barfield thesis assumes two things. One: that Inner Asian steppe regions are not economically
capable of supporting a self-sufficient state, and two: that a steppe empire can only rise
contemporarily with a consolidated Chinese state.
However, a number of scholars, chief among them Michael R. Drompp and Nicola Di
Cosmo, have rightly criticized both of these premises, very often using the Turks as the testcase.
For one thing, there is the obvious fact that the rise of the First Turkic Khaganate does not
coincide with a powerful Chinese state; in fact. the moments of the Khaganate's greatest
weakness coincides with a powerful Chinese State. More damning, however, is the fact that

nomadic states were not economically dependent on independent settled empires. Though it can
indeed be tempting to be overly schematic in applying Lattimore's ecological dichotomy, there
were always agriculturalists Ii ving alongside pastoralists throughout much of Inner Asia. 75 Inner
Asian states existing in heavily agricultural areas exhibit the same characteristics as those
dependent on pastoralism. 76 Inner Asian people were not economically dependent on the separate
ecology of settled states, but even if they were, as Michael Drompp has pointed out, China was
far from the only settled power to exploit - as demonstrated by the westward expansion.77 Even
urbanization, often considered the ultimate distinction from the Chinese world, is extant in Inner
Asia from the beginning, although naturally in a different form.78 Clearly, the Barfield model is
insufficient.
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So where does that leave the Turkic Khaganate? In his revised periodization, Di Cosmo
places them as the first of his "trade-tribute empires," that is, an empire whose revenue was
drawn both from the collection of tribute and from trade - often more from the latter than the
fonner. 79 This contrasts with prior '"tribute empires" like the Xiongnu and later ··dual
administration empires" (an integration of sedentary administration and taxation with a nomadic
structure) like the pre-Khubilai Mongols. 80 In many ways, this characterization is accurate.
While it might be an overreach to christen an age of Pax Turcica, the Turkic conquest of Eurasia
did usher in a period of increased trade. 81 The Turks had an extremely close relationship with the
Sogdian masters of the Silk Road, a fact attested nowhere better than in the Sogdian Maniakh's
mission to Justin II. In this any many other cases, the diplomatic activity was inextricably tied
with trade concerns, and, as such, Sogdians were principal arbiters. The redistribution and
conspicuous consumption ofluxury goods received from trade served as a key component in the
power of the Ashina Clan. 82
However, a reading which focuses exclusively on trade and tribute is insufficient for the
Turkic Khaganate. Owing to the Sinological focus of most scholars, the unique contributions of
the Western regions have been overlooked. While in the east, the Turks adopted much of the
Rouran system, dating back to the Xiongnu, their Western domains had much more in common
with the earlier empires of the Hephthalites or the Kushans. Like those two empires, the Western
Turkic Khaganate was an incredibly diverse political unit, in which pastoral nomads, Sogdian
merchant princes, Iranian aristocrats, and the builders of the Buddhas of Bamiyan coexisted.
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Richard Payne has argued convincingly for the creation of a new sociopolitical synthesis in the
region, rooted in the Iranian model, which he (following the Iranian sources) calls Turan. 83
Fortunately for the Turks, the Hephthalites had done much of the grunt work in building that
synthesis, and they had themselves been heirs of Sasanian systems.
Our best evidence comes from Bactria, only conquered by the Turks in the seventh
century, but the conditions are similar enough along the Iranian border zone to speculate that
similar systems were in place elsewhere and earlier. In Bactria, the Turks adopted the
Hephthalite system of a poll tax, tog, and possibly even reintroduced the Sasanian land tax,

uarg. 84 From the Bactrian perspective, the transition was rather smooth, merely changing the
adjective from ebodal (Hephthalite) to khaganag (of the Khagan). The Turks, as had the Huns
and Hcphthalitcs before them, collected these taxes through intermediaries stationed in the cities,
again continuing an ultimately Iranian tradition. 85 It appears, then, that the Western Khaganate
had coherent systems of taxation, not tribute or trade, but the orderly, bureaucratic extraction of
funds from its subjects.
In addition, the Turco-Sogdian connection went much farther than a simple trade
relationship. Indeed, at the beginning of the period the Sogdians were not the great masters of the
silk road that they would become. Prior to the Turks, Sogdiana were among many players in
Trans-Eurasian trade, certainly a region with increasing potential, but always considered of
marginal importance by the empires centered in Balkh. 86 The sixth and seventh centuries
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witnessed an explosion of the Sogdian economy and urbanization, manifested in the construction
of a vast "urban network" throughout the region. 87 Notably, however, these were not merely
gussied-up trade depots. Rather, they represent an extension of the Turanian city-based
administration system - the same system used to extract tax through intermediaries. 88 What is
more, the connections between Turk and Sogdian systems ran even deeper - intermarriage was
common, which "'facilitated [the Turks') integration into the aristocratic networks of their
sedentary counterparts." 89 Certainly, this is not enough evidence to suggest that the Turkic state
was funded primarily with tax, but it does problematize the tribute and trade model of Di Cosmo.
If anything, the Western Khaganate starts to look more like a later "dual administration" empire,
ruling hand in glove with its settled population.
However, the Western Turks were not only a continuation of the Turanian tradition. The
greatest distinction is the Turkic Khaganate' s expansion west. As has been mentioned, precise
dates here are hard to come by, but Turkic power had certainly reached the Black Sea by the
early 560s. Nearly all of this land was inhabited by nomadic pastoralists, and the prior powers of
Turan had shown no interest in them. Why were the Turks interested? If the sources are taken at
their word, this is part of the continual pursuit of the Rouran/Avars west. However, this
explanation is unsatisfactory given what we know about the Rouran flight hypothesis. More
plausible is the idea that the westward expansion arose from the universal claims of the Turk
Khagans. 90 We know so little about the area that any theories are conjecture. It is possible,
however, that the expansion was motivated by the desire to bring more nomadic peoples into the
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Western Khaganate's fold, of especial importance considering the nomadic structure of the anny.
Put simply, the more peoples conquered, the more soldiers available.
All that is to say that the Turkic Khaganate was unprecedented - a powerful admixture of
diverse resources and revenue streams, drawing on settled and nomadic peoples alike. However,
this raises an important question, fundamental to diplomacy and administration alike. How
united were the Western and Eastern Khaganates? On the one hand, it may not matter a great
deal; the resources of both Khaganates were great enough to stand alone. But on the other, it
matters more than any other question about the administration, especially insofar as the
relationship with Rome is concerned. It is thus unfortunate that the question is incredibly
difficult to answer. Part of the problem is a change over time; the desultory succession crisis
which began after the death of Bumin's sons played out between East and West resulting in a
split in 583, warfare, reconsolidation, and a formal split after Tardush's brief reign as Supreme
Khagan c. 603. Compounding that problem, however, is the paucity of sources, which makes a
definitive answer hard to come by.
As Denis Sinor notes, the tendency in the scholarship has been to emphasize the split
between West and East, even before the political split at the very end of the sixth century. 91 That
argument is principally based on both the gigantic size of the Turkic Khaganate and the inherent
differences between ruling East and West. The Chinese sources make it abundantly clear that
there are many divisions within the Turk Khaganatc from the beginning, although those divisions
are far more numerous than the mere bipartite model 92 In this system, the West was ruled by a
yabghu (or yabghu khagan), a position usually taken to be one step down from the supreme
khagan. However, these titles are in constant flux, and khagans are also capable of coexisting,
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among other seeming absurdities. 93 It is thus important not to be overly schematic in divining
status and power from titulature, despite the Chinese sources attempts to do so. However, it is
very notable that the rulers of the Western Turks retain yabghu as their title, even after the
seemingly straightforward split of 603. Suffice it to say that the partition of the Khaganate was
far from clean, and never rigidly adhered to.
Perhaps an explanation for the confusing and ever-changing governance at the highest
levels of the empire can be found in the nature of Turk rule. The principal method of coherence
in the Turkic Khaganate was not administrative, i.e. that the supreme khagan sat at the head of a
system ofleaders, but cultic, i.e. that the supreme khagan was imbued with religious
significance. A khagan was a fundamentally charismatic leader, whose power arose from his
connection to heaven, as demonstrated by his qut, a Turkic word that encompasses concepts like
the vital force ofrulership and supernatural good fotiune. 94 Even more so than the Khagan,
however, it was the Ashina clan themselves who were the charismatic force intimately connected
to the Turkic cosmology. 95 That sacredness was compounded by the possession of a holy place the Otuken Yz§ - which demonstrated the qut. 96 Thus, the Eastern Khaganate was always the
sacral heart of the Turkic peoples, powerful not because of its power on Earth, but because of its
connection to heaven. It is telling that the Western Turks never ceased to send envoys to the East
for religious ceremonies. 97
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There is thus a dichotomy at the heart of the West-East division. On the one hand, the
political and administrative forces tended to pull the two apart over the era, but on the other, the
cultural and religious lifeblood of the charismatic structure held the disparate parts together. As
much of a cop-out as it sounds, the best response to these problems is to consider the Western
and Eastern Khaganates as differently separated at different times. While the hard split of603 (or
even earlier) still has a place in marking general trends, the degree of partition was motivated by
individual khagans and in response to specific circumstances at the time. This is the only model
that can account for a Western Khan, Tong Yabghu, who continues the use ofyabghu, acts
entirely separately from the East, and attempts to gain the title of supreme khagan for himself. As
such, the degree of separation between east and west will here be treated on an individual level
with an appreciation for change over time, insofar as the evidence allows.
Where, then, does that leave diplomacy9 As Barfield sagely notes, "Inner Asian Nomadic
States were organized as 'imperial confederacies,' autocratic and statelike in foreign affairs, but
consultative and federally structured intcrnally." 98 That general statement bears out in the case of
the Turkic KJ1aganate. Their interactions with the Romans, Persians, and Chinese alike all evince
a unified and sophisticated diplomatic presentation, regardless of internal political events.
Perhaps it is most telling that the Romans report none of the preceding power struggles, even as
the Romans unknowingly traipse right into the middle of them. It is doubtful too that the
Sasanians had much of a sense that the Turks were "partitioning'' as they sent an army deep into
the Iranian plateau.
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Michael R. Drompp notes that, unlike in many states, foreign diplomacy was a significant
tool of state-making and internal cohesion in Inner Asian empircs. 99 This general principle shows
nowhere better than in the Turks. After all, the initial rise to power was predicated more on the
Turkic ability to negotiate an alliance with a settled Chinese state than pure might alone. So too,
the conquest of the Hcphthalites was enabled through an alliance of convenience with the
Sasanians. For all that the Roman and Chinese sources tend to portray the Turks as simple
barbarians, the careful use of diplomacy was as integral to their survival as their ability to
conquer a city. It is thus unsurprising that the Turks approached Constantinople first, and not
vice versa. The opportunity for an alliance was there, and the Turks had all the tools to forge it.
Unbeknownst to the Romans, these were not yet another tribe of long-haired, bow-legged
barbarians, but a genuine empire which served as the culmination of centuries of developments
in Inner Asia. But unbeknownst to the Turks, they had found an ally who would not be won
easily.

Michael R. Drompp "Strategies of Cohesion and Control in the Tilrk and Uyghur Empires," in Complexity of
Interaction Along the Eurasian Steppe Zone in the First A1il!ennium CE, ed. Jan Bemmann and Michael Schmauder
(Bonn: Vor- und Friihgeschichtliche Archaologie Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitat, 20 I 5), 439-41
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Section Three: Turco-Roman Diplomacy in the Time of Justin II
The first alliance with the Turks, commencing under Justin II, is no doubt our best
documented, owing especially to the excellent treatment given by Menander Protector. It is thus
unsurprising that it is also among the most studied. However, a careful reading of the account of
Menander, in conjunction with the many other written sources which touch on it, reveals many
facets that have yet gone unappreciated. Although Menander tries very hard to convince his
audience of the importance of the alliance and the Romans' commitment to it, the facts he
presents simply do not line up with that interpretation. Far from being a strategic masterstroke,
using the Turkic Empire to force the Sasanians into a two-front war, Justin H's alliance with the
Turks was in fact simply one of many diplomatic maneuvers aimed at escalation, designed more
to frighten than to destroy. The inconstancy and haughtiness exhibited by the Roman state here
will cast a pall over all future negotiations with the Turks.
The first diplomatic contact between the Turks and Romans seems to have occurred at the
very end of Justinian's reign, in 563. Unfortunately, we know next to nothing about this
encounter apart from a tantalizingly brief mention in Theophanes the Confessor: "In the same
month [July of 563] envoys arrived from Aske!, king of the Hermichiones.'' 100 The
Hermichionites have been identified as the "Kirmikhiones" described as an alternative name for
the Turks by Theophanes of Byzantium. 101 Their "king," Aske!, has been subject to a number of
readings and onomastic interpretations, none of which are clearly convincing. 102 In any case, the
biggest missing piece of Theophancs' account is the purpose of these "envoys." It is not at all
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clear that this was intended as a diplomatic mission or an attempt at an alliance. Ce11ainly, there
were no appreciable results of the embassy, and Menander Protector can describe the major
embassy of 568 without mention of earlier contacts.
However, the ambiguity does not entirely preclude some speculative conclusions from
being drawn. For one thing, it is highly significant that the Turks sent the embassy first,
apparently unprompted, as they had done with the Sasanians. Such a proactivity suggests the
importance of diplomacy to the Turks in general and the interest in Rome in particular. As has
already been observed, the elimination of the Hephthalite threat had ruined the already rather ad
hoc Turco-Sasanian accord, and a new stabilizing alliance was clearly needed. This earlier
embassy may also account for the seeming ease of diplomacy relayed in Menander's account of
the 568 embassy. Despite the generally fragmentary nature of Menander· s history, this seems to
be a coherent, self-contained narrative, with little room for substantial lacunae. It is entirely
possible that Menander is simply eliding many of the details, either deliberately or from
ignorance, but his account depicts none of the expected hiccups of a novel relationship (visible,
for example, in Justinian's A var troubles). An earlier, foundation-laying embassy would explain
that strange familiarity.
In any case, this earlier embassy could hardly have compared to the embassy of 568. The
fullest account of the proceedings is given by Menander Protector, 103 although important
supplements to it are provided by other historians, especially John of Ephesus, Theophanes the
Confessor, and Theophanes Byzantinus. According to Menander, the Turks first sent an embassy
to the Persians, seeking permissions to sell raw silk within their empire, but Khusro expelled the
ambassadors and burned the silk. That first embassy was Sogdian by extraction, under the
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leadership ofManiakh. 104 When Ishtemi (Sizaboulos) heard of the Sasanian rejection, he sent
another embassy "since he wished to establish friendly relations between them and his own
state." 105 This time Khusro had them murdered (presumably Maniakh was not among them). It
was only after this indignity that the Turks turned to Rome.
This is a fascinating prologue to the Roman embassy, one unattested by other sources,
and thereby representing our only real glimpse into the collapse Turco-Sasanian relations. For
one thing, it places the blame on Khusro. In itself, that is somewhat suspicious, given hath the
general tendencies of Roman histories when it comes to "Oriental despots'' and the fact that the
story most likely came from the Turkic embassy to Constantinople. But, on the other hand, there
is nothing to disprove it either.
If indeed Khusro was the primary cause of the alliance's collapse. one wonders why.
Menander reports that one Katulph, a Hephthalite who had betrayed his people to the Turks,
convinced Khusro of the Turks' "untrustworthiness." 106 However, ascribing these political
decisions to a single individual is a fundamental topos of classical history, and the tendency of
scholars has rightly been to search for a deeper reason. Peter Golden speculates that there might
have been a commercial motivation - namely that the Sasanians did not want to grant the Turks
entry into their western silk market. 107 However, one wonders whether Khusro would have done
so, since the Turks could and indeed did simply take their business to the Romans, who were in
the market for new trade route. 108 Rather. it is more likely that the direct impetus for Khusro 's
rejection had more to do with the simple strategic reality of the northeastern frontier- with the

104 Despite Blockley's description of Maniakh as a turkic name (History, 262, n.113), Maniakh has been
reconstructed convincingly as a Sogdian one, Golden, Introduction, 128.
105 Men. Prat., Fr. I 0.1
106 Men. Prat., Fr. IO.I.
107 Golden, Introduction, 128.
ioa For the Romans' rather recent attempts to connect with "Ethiopian" (Aksumite) trade, see Procop. wars, 1,20.1-9
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Hephthalites gone, the Turks were obviously the primary rival for the wealthy states of the Oxus
river valley.
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De la Vaissiere notes that the rejection of the silk was "a lofty refusal to use the

most symbolic fruit of [Turkic] expansion.'' 110
Whatever the reason, the Turks' alliance with Sasanians was dead, and the Romans were
the natural ally against their newfound enemy. To that end, lshtemi dispatched Maniakh on an
embassy to Constantinople, carrying with him a gift of raw silk and a letter. Speaking to the
diplomatic sophistication at the Turks' disposal, Maniakh evidently performed beautifully, doing
"everything according to the laws offriendship." 1II Theophanes Byzantinus adds an interesting
wrinkle in noting that the Romans presented silk back to Maniakh's embassy, the Romans
having gotten their hands on some Chinese silkworrns. 112 As shocked as the Turks may have
been, the domestic production could certainly not match the quality and quantity of silk from
China. Although the presence of silk clearly implies a trade connection, the Turkic embassy also
had a diplomatic agenda from the outset, "asked the Romans for peace and an offensive and
defensive alliance" and "added that they were also very willing to crush those enemies of the
Roman state who were pressing upon their tcrritory." 113
Fortunately for the Turks, they had come at a perfect time. Justinian had died in 565, and
was succeeded by his nephew Justin II, who was of a rather different temperament, one much
more favorable for the Turks. As Michael Whitby has noted, "Justin is traditionally judged, and
condemned ... because of his handling of the empire's external affairs." 114 As such, his efforts in
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the east have been thoroughly examined, although a full analysis cannot detain us here. 115 His
policy can be summed up as a rather aggressive one, and, unlike his predecessor, one highly
unwilling to spend money on things like tribute payments. Most onerous, in his mind, were the
payments to the Persians, which were the most taxing on both the coffers and imperial dignity.
As such, he was set against the treaty of 562, and moved almost immediately to subvert it with a
new, aggressive posture in Sasanian relations - visible especially in the diplomatic conflict over
Suania. 116 In this respect, Justin II and the Turks had a mutual enemy, and were thus natural
allies.
It is therefore unsurprising that Justin was highly receptive to the Turks' proposal. After
practically interrogating the Turks for details about geo- and ethnographic detail, 117 Justin, on
Menander's account, seemingly embraced the alliance then and there. Presumably to put the final
touches on the alliance negotiation, Justin dispatched Zemarchus, his magister militum per

Orientem, 118 to return with Maniakh to lshtemi's court. Clearly, Zemarchus' extraordinary
journey into the heart of Eurasia excited the imagination of Menander and his audience, and the
excursus on his mission is rich in ethnographic detail. However, the geography is highly
problematic. Establishing an exact itinerary and the precise location of the Turkic court he
visited is exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible. 119 This problem is of minimal importance to
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the present examination; it suffices to say that he journeyed very far inland (despite Menander's
underselling of''many days'' 120 ) to a Turkic power center called Ektag.

Western Turkic Khaganate
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Many themes found in Zemarchus' mission will recur throughout Turco-Roman
diplomacy. Zemarchus participated in a shamanic (here loosely defined) purification ritual before
being admitted into the Turkic heartland. Most likely, participating in the ritual was a sign of
good faith for the Turks, and imbued the proceedings with the same sacral aura that the oaths did
to the Romans. When Zemarchus met with Ishtemi in his extravagant, golden furniture-filled
tent, the two exchanged diplomatic pleasantries and got down to business - namely, feasting and
drinking. This demonstrates an important point about Turco-Roman diplomacy. In many cases,
the personal relationship between ambassador and host seems far more important than the heady
political negotiations we might expect. Indeed, Menander, otherwise detailed in such areas,
relates nothing of the sort. Rather, he emphasizes the building of a friendship between
Zemarchus and Ishtemi parallel to that of the Roman and Turkic states. It is possible that, again,
the topoi of our sources are distorting the picture somewhat. But, more deeply, the sources reveal
the underlying thought that empowered that personal relationship. In a society which reduces
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complex political phenomena to individuals, of course the main instrument of diplomacy would
be through individuals.
Presumably, however, there were also some negotiations sprinkled in between the
revelries, and an agreement was struck with apparent ease. As a means of completing the
alliance, Zemarchus and his closest associates (including a newly gifted female slave) joined
lshtemi on a campaign against the Sasanians. But on the way, they were met by a Sasanian
embassy while encamped at Talas. 121 Given the fact that Khusro had so violently refused Turkic
diplomacy, one wonders why he would send an embassy now; Golden is probably correct in
seeing the motive more as sabotage of a Roman alliance than a genuine attempt to reopen
diplomacy.
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John of Ephesus gives further insight into their argument, wherein they claimed

that the Romans were merely their slaves, as evinced by the tribute payments stipulated in
562.

123

This argument was unsuccessful. All the embassy earned was a place of dishonor and an

eventual banishment. With them left the last hurdle to a Turco-Roman alliance, or so it seemed.
After the alliance was concluded, Zemarchus began his return journey home. Narrowly
avoiding a Persian ambush in the Caucasus, he returned home to Constantinople in 571. 124 All in
all, then. Zemarchus' embassy was exceedingly successful, and had begun the relationship in the
best way possible. Through careful analysis, it also reveals a great deal about the goals and
nature of Turco-Roman cooperation. Most importantly, the alliance was directed against the
Sasanians, not the A vars. For all that the Turks notify the Romans that the A vars were their
rightful slaves and that they will one day reclaim them, 125 the alliance was never meant for that
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purpose by either side. In fact, Menander does not mention them during the Zemarchus embassy,
and the other historians do not mention them at all in this context. Its absence bears a great deal
of emphasis here since the A var problem will become a central one later.
Menander further emphasizes that targeting the Sasanians was Justin's main goal, as
"with the Turks attacking from one direction and the Romans from another, the Persians would
easily be destroyed." 126 In fact, he outright states that the alliance with the Turks "most
encouraged Justin to open hostilities to the Pcrsians.'' 127 Despite that, the casus be/Ii for the war
came not from the Turks but from Annenia. 128 It may indeed be the case that, as Turtledove
suggests, the Turkic alliance "encouraged Justin II to be more favorably inclined toward war." 129
However, it bears mention that the alliance had not yet been totally formalized when Justin
began to foment rebellion in Annenia - Zemarchus was still on the steppe. 130 At that point, all
the Romans had was a general declaration of peace and friendship. Certainly, it would not be out
of character for Justin to act impetuously, having simply assumed that the Turkic alliance would
succeed. But it could also well be that the Turkic alliance was not as strong a motivator for Justin
as Menander suggests.
Indeed, when the war with the Sasanians broke out in 572, the Turkic alliance
mysteriously disappears from Menander's pages. as it does with our other sources for the period.
There are no great battles on the Sasanians· northeastern border, and Khusro's attention seems to
have been focused entirely on the western front. It is also possible that our sources were simply
ignorant of the affairs in the far east, but that alone (especially for the well-connected Menander)
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would indicate the lack of a coordinated alliance. That is not to imply that there was no action
between Sasanians and Turks. Given the hostilities established in Zemarchus' visit, it would only
be natural to assume that there were Turkic incursions. But the Roman war effort failed, and
Justin had a mental breakdown; all the while, the Turks were nowhere to be found.
That lack of mention raises a fundamental question about the 568 alliance - what exactly
did it do? From the outset, it seems as though there was very little change afier Zemarchus' visit.
The Turks seem to already have been hostile with the Persians at least by the events at Talas, and
there was clearly no coordinated action with the Romans atter the outbreak of their Persian War
in 572 - otherwise our sources would surely mention it. For their part, the Romans had been
inching towards war with the Sasanians since Justin's accession, even without the confidence
booster of the Turkic alliance. It may well be that, as Turtledove states, ''the Byzantine-Turkish
connection was at this time more trouble than it was worth." 131
There is, however, reason to suggest that the Turkic alliance was little ·'trouble'· at all.
Certainly, for Menander, it was a central event, but this may well owe more to his sources than to
its importance. For the other major historians of the period, the Turkic alliance is not as
prominent a factor, seeing only a brief mention, often alongside other diplomatic embassies. 132
Zcmarchus· journey to the Turkic court was indeed remarkable (although, given the Romans'
general lack of geographic information of the steppes, 133 it is doubtful he knew it would be so
distant until the middle of the journey), but the general principle was not. As magister militum
per Orientem, negotiating and alliance with barbarians was well within his purview, as
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demonstrated, for example, in his successor Justinian's negotiation with the Ghassanids. 134 As
noted by Dobrovits, the language of"peace and alliance" is rare for barbarians, 135 but Menander
presents this as a request from the Turks, not something the Roman offered.
But if the alliance with the Turks was not the silver bullet Menander portrays, what was
Justin's purpose in pursuing it? Rather than an altogether unique experiment, it is wiser to view
the Turkic alliance as a part of a pattern of diplomatic troublemaking that was the key to Justin's
foreign policy. From Suania to Annenia to Arabia, Justin was constantly interfe1ing with local
politics and escalating the hitherto donnant conflicts between Roman and Sasanian interests. In
so doing, he was working against his despised treaty of 562 and its resultant payments. Forming
an alliance with the Turks fit into that mold quite nicely. Simply by accepting a Sogdian trade
delegation in Constantinople, he had violated the provision of the treaty forcing barbarian
merchants to go through approved entrep6ts at Dara and Nisibis. 136 Further, Justin must have
known that the alliance would have sent signals to Khusro that a war was imminent. For this
purpose, the fact that the alliance was more real in perception than in ··sober fact'' does not
particularly matter. 137 All of this fits in exceedingly well with Justin's general policy of
escalation on the eastern frontier, likely pushing for a renegotiated treaty without the payments.
If this was his goal, then it worked quite well. As indicated by his numerous attempts to
stop the alliance with both diplomacy and murder, Khusro clearly saw a great deal of danger in
the possibility. As Patterson notes, the fear of nomads could well have loomed large in his mind,
given the defeat of Peroz by the Hephthalites in 484. 138 In fact, Theophanes Byzantinus directly
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links Khusro's fears to his expeditions into the Arabian Peninsula. 139 Justin had successfully
applied pressure and had earned an Armenian war for his trouble. However, the Turks had served
their role, and the alliance had no particular reason to continue. Justin was more than capable of
simply dropping alliances no longer of immediate use. A similar act of inconstancy would later
lead to a deterioration of relations with his Ghassanid allies, with quite disastrous results. 140
Regardless of their strength as an empire, the Turks were a part of this game more than a genuine
strategic consideration. In that sense, then, there was little difference between them and the other
peripheral barbarians, like the A vars or Arabs.
Despite Menander's assurances of Justin's commitment, the events rather seem to
indicate a failure on the part of the Romans to follow up on the commitments Zemarchus made.
Menander mentions a continuation of embassies from either side, but recounts none in detail, and
none seem to have resulted in any major developments of the alliance. The Romans were, of
course, rather occupied by the Sasanian war, but it is easy to see from the Turkic viewpoint how
uninvested the Romans seemed in an alliance. This is especially magnified ifwe compare the
Roman alliance with the other great alliances in living memory of the Turks, with the Wei and
Sasanians. In both cases, the alliance had been quite rapidly sealed with a diplomatic marriage
and coordinated military action had occurred shortly thereafter. Neither of these things happened
with the Romans. The Turks had good reason to feel that the Romans were simply leading them
on, and as suggested above, they may well have been. It is thus hardly shocking that the relations
between the two empires began to disintegrate rapidly.
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Section Four: The Collapse of the Turco-Roman Accord

Ultimately, it was Justin II's successors who reaped what he had had sown, and the
alliance would collapse at the beginning of Tiberius's reign, It did so in suitably dramatic
fashion, with the virulent accusations of Tourxanthos recorded in Menander. Thus came the
nadir of Turco-Roman relations, the Turks' invasion of the Roman Crimea. Traditionally
(including in the Roman sources), conflict over the A vars has been considered the primary
reason for this collapse. 141 However, this view requires some modification; the contributing
factors to the collapse are manifold and not always easily perceptible in Menander's account
alone. The question of why this collapse stuck is almost as interesting as the reason for the
collapse in the first place, although the sheer paucity of sources (both in general and in reference
to the Turks) render a definitive answer impossible. In any case, the collapse ranks, alongside
Zemarchus' embassy and the invasion of Transcaucasia, as a moment of signal import, setting
the tone for Turco-Roman relations thenceforth.
From the Roman perspective, the collapse of relations with the Turks was incredibly
sudden. In the latter years of Justin's sanity, relations had continued in some capacity. Menander
attests to the presence of I 06 Turks in Constantinople, who had been sent, as Menander
unhelpfully relates, on "various occasions." 142 Menander gives a list of proper names of the
ambassadors they had accompanied without any specification of times or embassies. Blockley
suggests that this is probably a summary of another, fuller account of post-Zemarchus TurcoRoman diplomacy, either in a lost fragment of Menander or in his source. 143 In any case, a basic
headcount (in addition to Menander's note that one ambassador went twice) would give a rough
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estimate of at least six embassies. The Orkhon Inscriptions, some 250 years later, record that the
people came from the nation of"Apurum'' to the funeral of!shtemi in 576; 144 an identification of
"Apurum" with "Rome" is tempting, although ultimately unprovable. 145 Furthem1ore, these later
inscriptions may well exaggerate or refer to the mission ofValentinus (in which Ishtemi is
indeed mourned). It is, however, doubtful that any of these embassies were on the scale of
Zemarchus' or the upcoming mission of Valcntinus.
In 576, two years after Tiberius II's crowning as Caesar, he sent another envoy to the
Turks, this one headed by one Valentinus, an imperial bodyguard. 146 This can be seen as part of
the general foreign policy aims of Tiberius and his co-regent, the Empress Sophia, which
emphasized rapprochement with Roman allies, even those who had abandoned Justin. 147 So too
was this matched by negotiations with the Sasanians. It would, however, be too simplistic to
wholly contrast Tiberius· and Justin's agendas. Even as Tiberius and Sophia pursued a truce with
the Persians, they continued to build a force against them, expanding the army and building a
coalition of barbarian allies. 148 Reaffirming and redoubling the alliance with the Turks fit well
within that plan.
Valentinus was well-qualified for the position. He was that selfsame two-time
ambassador to the Turks, and apparently had a substantial entourage at his disposal. In addition,
he traveled to the Khaganate alongside all 106 Turks who were in Constantinople. 149 This does
read as slightly odd, and Blockley's reading of the Turks' abandonment of the city as a grim
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portent of the coming collapse is understandable, if not provable. 150 At the very least, the fact
that every one of the Turks came along is suggestive of the importance of this mission. Sailing
across the Black Sea, Valentinus traveled from Bosporus into Turkic territory, although
corruption of the Greek and geographical confusion render a precise itinerary impossible to
establish. 151 On his way to the court of the Western Yabghu Khagan, he first met with
Tourxanthos.
The identity of this Tourxanthos has been debated within the historiography. He is
certainly separate from Tardush, the ultimate heir of Ishtemi, as Menander mentions a
"Tardou."' 152 Unlike the earlier embassy, Valentinus did not meet with the ruler of the Western
Turks. The name Tourxanthos has been identified as a rendering of the title Turk-shad - which is
elsewhere attested in the Turkic system. 153 However, this means that we do not have a personal
name (like Bumin or lshtemi) by which to identify him. According to Menander, Tourxanthos
was one of the sub-rulers of the Turkic Khaganate, which had been divided into eight parts after
the death of lshtemi and come under the supreme rule of one "Arsilas." 154 He was also the son of
lshtemi and thereby brother ofTardush. Valentinus met with Tourxanthos because he was the
first stop on his journey to the court of the Y abghu Khagan, suggesting that his power base was
in the far west.
That set of attributes does not line up with any figures mentioned in the Chinese sources.
the most reliable charts of Turkic history. Denis Sinor points out that our Chinese sources never
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mention any sons of Ishtemi other than Tardush. 155 However, absence of evidence is not
evidence of absence, and it seems perfectly plausible that a western-based son of Ishtemi (there
were likely a great many) could well have escaped the Chinese radar. Furthermore, the
succession of Ishtcmi is rather underreported. Stereotypically, the succession systems of steppe
empires are ill-defined and instigate internecine violence. That formulation would appear in the
Turkic state, notably in the contentious succession to Taspar after his death in 581. 156 However,
we lack evidence for any such conflict after Ishtemi •s death. It rather appears that the transition
to Tardush's reign was a peaceful one. with the Western steppes remaining united. And before
the succession crisis of 581, Tardush was firmly ensconced as junior to the Eastern Khagan.
Tourxanthos thus cannot be taken as a rogue element. It is much more likely that he was
executing the foreign policy of his superiors.
Upon his presentation to Tourxanthos, Valentinus naturally indulges in the diplomatic
pleasantries of rejoicing the emperor and expressed his desire to '·reconfirm just as strongly" the
alliance with Ishtemi. " 7 In reply, Tourxanthos immediately began ranting about Roman
duplicity: "Are you not those very Romans who use ten tongues and lie with all ofthem?" 158
Valentinus and the envoys were treated to a litany of more specific accusations and outright
threats against their lives. No doubt, the aim had now been shifted from negotiating an alliance to
getting out alive. On Menander's account. the envoys were only spared due to Tourxanthos'
sorrow at Ishtemi' s death. The Romans were compelled to slash their cheeks as a symbol of
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mourning,

159

but otherwise escaped unscathed, being sent on to meet with Tardush. However, on

the way, the Turks attacked the Roman city of Bosporus, signaling that the rage ofTourxanthos
was not mere bluster. Valentinus and his embassy returned home, having lost the alliance rather
than renegotiated it.
Menander's information was good. A.O. Lee reasonably postulates that records of
embassies were indeed kept at the imperial capital, and Menander had access to them, as
demonstrated by his account of Zemarchus. 160 However, his portrayal ofTourxanthos is riddled
with topoi that render the characterization quite troublesome; whether originating in those
sources or Menander's editorializing, Tourxanthos' perfect adherence to Roman stereotypes
raises questions. Above all, he is defined by his a).a(owicx - his undue arrogance and
boastfulness. This is among the most common and widely reviled barbarian characteristics in the
Greco-Roman tradition. It is, for example, commonly used by Plutarch in describing
barbarians, 161 and Polybius sees it as a principal failing of Hannibai. 162 More contemporary to
Menander, Procopius and Agathias both attribute (xic1x(ow:ia to the Persians. 163 Menander's
Tourxanthos is also nakedly duplicitous, secretly beginning the invasion of Bosporus even as he
claims that "to lie is alien to the Turk." 164 Menander has crafted here the perfect representation of
a bad barbarian, and for that reason, it is important not to simply take his vision at face value.
The precise historicity of Menander's given speech notwithstanding, his treatment of
Tourxanthos' complaints is specific enough to suggest that they are broadly accurate. Menander
most heavily focuses on the Avar problem. Tourxanthos apparently considered the Roman
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negotiation and settlement with the A vars to be in a violation of the Turks' sovereignty over
them - they arc their slaves (6ov}.01). 165 For Menander, Tourxanthos' Avar claim is the supreme
example of his b),o.(ovcio.. Tourxanthos (and by extension, the Turkic state) is claiming
sovereignty over a group of people clearly shown to be independent of them. Clearly, this
confonns to the topos of the arrogant barbarian. However, given the universalist claims of Turkic
rule, 166 it could well be a misunderstanding of the Turks' actual ideology. More problematic is
the accusation that the Romans had violated that sovereignty in making a treaty with the A vars.
Crucially, Tourxanthos does not claim that the Romans have taken the Avars as their subjects.
Rather, what he seems to be implying is that the peace treaty between A vars and Romans would
prevent the Turks from ''trampl[ingl [the A vars] under the hooves of our horses.'' 167
One wonders what the logic is here. Menander certainly does not explain it. Presumably,
the treaty to which Tourxanthos refers is that of 571, 168 which was apparently a straightforward
peace treaty and hostage-taking, although this is a particularly fragmentary section of Menander.
Certainly, this would not preclude the Romans from allowing the Turks to conquer them. It
seems that Tourxanthos (and by extension, Tardush) would want the Romans to be allies in that
conquest. But as demonstrated above, the A vars were not a point of discussion before this point.
When Maniakh traveled to Constantinople, he did indeed mention that the Turks considered the
Avars their rightful subjects, but only as a response to a direct question; the A vars vanish from
negotiations thereafter. The alliance was anti-Sasanian, not anti-Avar. Unfortunately, the
fragmentary nature of Menander's history means that the possibility of an account of formal
Turco-Roman discussions of the A var problem being lost cannot be excluded. However, it is
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notable that Zemarchus' negotiations occur in a rather clear sequence in one substantial fragment
with a beginning, middle, and end. If Menander did record such discussions, it would have made
sense for them to occur here.
Why, then, should the Turks expect assistance against the A vars? It seems to be an
unreasonable expectation. Perhaps that was the point. This complaint against the Romans was
unfair, and the Romans could not reasonably respond to it except by vague groveling, as
Valentinus does. Furthennore, the treaty was already signed- there was nothing the Romans
could do to change it now. Unlike the other claims, the A var complaint is grounded in a single
specific incident - the negotiation of a treaty - which makes the alliance null and void. It thus
provided an expedient escape from the alliance for the Turks, regardless of whether it was
actually the biggest issue at play.
What other reason would the Turks have? Menander does provide a secondary complaint,
one much more intriguing than the A vars. Tourxanthos alleges that the Romans "take my envoys
through the Caucasus to Byzantium, alleging that there is no other route,'' in order to deter him
"'from attacking the Roman Empire by the difiicult terrain." 169 It bears mention that this is
apparently true - we have no records of embassies leaving or entering the empire across the
Danube. Of course, said route would be rather circuitous and take longer, and the connection to
the Eurasian steppes had always been through the Cimmerian Bosporus and, over land, the
Caucasus_i7° But Tourxanthos' point is more about the Romans hiding the route's existence than
its practicality. We do not have any evidence for this, but before exonerating the Romans
entirely, it must be acknowledged that such manipulations were well within their wheelhouse. As
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discussed above, this tack was pulled against the A vars to keep them out of Scythia Minor (i.e.,
the same place the Turks were complaining about the Romans hiding). Control of movement was
key to the Romans' strategy against nomads, and it would not be shocking if it were deployed
here.
More important than its specific use here, however, is the Romans' general deployment
of the strategy. The issues of the A vars and Caucasian deception are just examples of the broader
problem - Roman duplicity. Tourxanthos opens with his accusation that the Romans "use ten
tongues and lie with all of them.'' 171 That accusation pertains not only to the Turks, but to '·all the
tribcs."

172

It is clear that, even without the specific incidents, the Turks had observed Roman

alliances with other peoples, including the A vars and Caucasians, and were none too pleased.
Correctly identifying the Roman policy, Tourxanthos accuses the Romans of"having flattered
and deluded all the tribes with your various speeches and your treacherous designs, when harm
descends upon their heads you abandon them and take all the benefits for yourselves." 173 Our
knowledge of diplomatic activity in the reign of Justin II is spotty- Menander is fragmentary
and Theophylact's value depends on his sources. 174 Thus, we can point to few specifics in the
Turks' vicinity. Nevertheless. we can observe the deployment of such duplicity in Justin's
dealings with the Saracens. 175 lt is unlikely that the Turks knew the specifics of this relationship,
but they could recognize the pattern made visible elsewhere.
Clearly, the taking of Bosporus was the greatest manifestation of Turkic displeasure.
However, the immediacy of the action - taken, as Menander relates, while Valentinus was
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travelling to Tardush's court, may indicate that it was not merely a reaction to the breakdown of
relations with Tourxanthos. The armies were evidently already in place well before Tourxanthos
gave the order and Tourxanthos himself being in a "war camp." 176 It sounds rather more like the
invasion was planned from the beginning, and the meeting with Valentinus merely an
announcement of the intention rather than a spur-of-the-moment decision. Certainly, control over
the Crimea was advantageous for the Turks - it was, after all, the nexus with the Romans, as
demonstrated by Valentinus' journey beginning there. Furthermore, the invasion appears to have
been very successful, with the Turks ultimately controlling Cherson (and thus the entire
peninsula).

177

An interest in Western expansion was, after all, demonstrated by Tourxanthos.

Perhaps the acquisition of this territory was enough to lose the alliance, especially in congress
with the knowledge that the Romans make poor friends.
The appeal of western expansion may well have been increased by the political realities
on the Turk's Persian frontier. Even the sparse records of the previous period fall off in the
period between the arrival of the Turks and the wars ofBahram Chobin, and thus anything said
about the Sasanian East at this time is provisional. We can show that the extant coinage indicates
strong Sasanian control south of the Oxus in the latter sixth century. 178 Furthermore, the major
campaign of Khusro into Armenia contemporary with Valentinus' mission might well indicate a
focus on the west that only a secure east could provide. 179 Certainly, there was no mustering of
forces on the level seen during Bahram Chobin's war. 180 If indeed Turkic expansion had been
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halted on the Oxus and some settlement reached with the Turks, the alliance with the Romans
would have outlived its usefulness, and the west would be the natural target for expansion.
For any of these explanations, it is of the utmost importance not to fall back on
monocausality. Particularly for premodem diplomacy, as personality driven as it was, any
number of these factors, or other, unknown ones could have offended Tourxanthos and the
Turkic rulership. Every one of these factors could well have damaged the relationship beyond
repair, and with all of them in play, the deck was stacked against the Romans, even if they had
no knowledge of that fact when they sent Valentinus. However, not to overdraw the breakdown
of the Turco-Roman alliance into a complete and total breakdown. Certainly, this was not a
shining diplomatic moment. However, the Turkic push into the Crimea did not result in an
empire-scale war between them. Trade continued. But the alliance, if ever it was truly alive, was
now well and truly dead. Furthermore, the close contact of .Justin's reign seems largely to have
ceased.
In the years between 576 and Heraclius, Roman sources cease referencing negotiations or
embassies with the Turks. Theophylact Simocatta records a letter sent by an unnamed Khagan to
Maurice. Principally, this letter serves as an excuse for a substantial excursus on Inner Asia; it is
here where Theophylact inserts his long, confused explanation of the so-called Pseudo-A vars. 181
Furthermore, he provides an equally confused account of an internal conflict in the Turkic state.
As tempting as this account is, the tendency in the scholarship has rightly been to ignore it, given
its lack of clarity and contradiction with Chinese sourccs. 182 In demonstration ofTheophylact's
confusing nature, Michael and Mary Whitby attempt to securely identify these events as the
succession crisis of 581. whereas Denis Sinor ascribes them to Tardush's conquest of the east c.
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598. 183 Neither are wholly convincing. In any case. there is no diplomatic action suggested in this
letter. Rather, if indeed it is historical, it served merely as a declaration of triumph.
A similar principle applies to the mention of Turks by Theophanes the Confessor, which
comes at the end of his coverage Maurice's war against Bahram Chobin (newly crowned Bahram
VI). According to Theophanes, Khusro II sent the Turks serving in the army of Bahram to back
to Constantinople, where they came before the emperor. 184 But before this is read as an
indication of a persisting alliance, there are a number of factors that must be considered. For one
thing, there is simply no way of knowing how precisely Theophanes is using "Turks" here, and,
given the ancient sources· tendency to play fast and loose with the term, they very well could not
have been the same Turks as the Western Khaganate. What is more, their presence within the
army of Bahram suggests that they were mercenaries, rather than a separate arn1y of the Khagan;
Theophanes does not give numbers for the Turks, so there is no way of knowing their strength.
Most importantly of all, Theophanes does give us a reason for their being returned to Rome that
has nothing to do with the Turkic Klrnganate: they were Christians. Apparently, they had
converted after a plague had affected their homelands, tattooing crosses on their foreheads. 185 As
tantalizing a clue as that is for the still poorly understood spread of Christianity in Inner Asia, it
has little to do with diplomacy between the two nations. As such, this incident can be dismissed
as contact between the Roman Empire and the Turkic Khaganate.
But besides these fleeting mentions, the Turks may as well cease to exist in the Roman
sources. Why was the collapse under Tiberius permanent 9 Certainly, the geopolitical favor of the
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alliance had not vanished. The Romans continued to war with the Sasanians through 591, with
war again breaking out in 602. For their part, the Turks were also in a major conflict with the
Sasanians, one in which they were defeated by Bahram Chobin. 186 The conditions thus seem to
have been as good in this period as they were in the 560s. And yet, there is no mention of an
alliance even being considered by either party.

It again bears emphasis that the Turks were the instigator of the alliance (and, indeed, the
actor in its collapse). If the Turks did not send an embassy, the Romans were highly unlikely to
instigate an alliance. And the Turks had good reasons not to send an embassy. At the root of all
their reasons is the continuing reign of Tardush, which, with some interruptions, ran until the
start of the sixth century. No doubt he, being the same khagan who presided over the collapse,
would have been particularly ill-disposed to renegotiating one and admitting he was wrong.
What is more, Tardush's reign marks the first major interregnum within the Turkic Empire,
culminating in his attempt to seize control of the east and elevate himself to the position of senior
khagan. 187 Throughout the period, there was scarcely the time to negotiate with the Romans,
even ifhe had wanted to, and in his main target - the east - they were irrelevant. It would take a
substantial reversal for the Romans and Turks to ally again.
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Section Five: Detente, Alliance, and the Last Great War of Antiquity
Given the collapse of Turco-Roman relations, it is remarkable that the recovery of the
alliance was as quick as it was. However, careful examination reveals that this second alliance
was a different beast entirely. Whereas the previous alliance had ultimately proven to be just
another Roman manipulation of a northern "Barbarian" group, this was a true alliance of equals.
Surely, Roman desperation lies at the heart of this sea change in Turkic policy, but their
desperation proved fruitful. The alliance with the Turks played the decisive role in the final years
of the Romans· great war with Persia, the so-called ·'Last Great War of Antiquity." But for all
that they had been effective allies in war, the Turks proved to also be a vital part of the post-war
settlement forged (principally) by Heraclius, the selfsame settlement which directly resulted in
the success of the early Islamic conquests.
The usurpation of Maurice by Phocas had renewed war between the Romans and
Sasanians. For the purposes of the present
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some victories over the Sasanians, although apparently at considerable cost. But arguably more
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important than any military action he took at this point, Heraclius focused on a diplomatic chann
campaign with the local leaders and peoples on both sides of the Caucasus (our sources are not
especially specific geographically), designed, as Theophanes reports, to encourage defections
from the Sasanians. 189
It is during this diplomatic campaign that negotiations with the Turks were reopened.

Most of the extant sources pay little attention to these negotiations, mentioning only the alliance
with the Turks as a/ail accompli. The great exception is Movses Dasxuranc'i, for whom the
Turks arc a major villain in his History a/Albania. Given his importance as a source, Movses
bears some assessment here. In reality, Movses was a compiler of previous material, much of
which was likely compiled by the time he wrote his history, likely in the tenth century. 190 James
Howard-Johnston has convincingly reconstructed a History of 682, likely written at or shortly
after that time, which serves as the core of Book 11. 191 It is this source that provides the narrative
of the Turks, drawn from "'a general overview of war and diplomacy, a vivid local Albanian
history written by an eyewitness ... and a piece of [the Albanian Catholicos] Viroy's writing."

102

As such, Movses' history is far more reliable as a source than its late date would imply.
I lowcver, Movses' account is not without its flaws. It is highly selective~ indeed, the
dramatic siege of Constantinople is not even mentioned. Since the author clearly had access to
the history attributed to Sebeos, it might be surmised that this work was meant to be read in
concert, and thus avoided redundancy. 103 Chronology is a major issue, with chapter 11 (which
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describes the Turkic invasion of Albania) being incorrectly placed before their alliance with
Heraclius. 194 As a direct transmission of the earlier History of 682, it maintains the older work's
apocalyptic worldview, clearly laid out in that work's preface (wholly preserved in the middle of
Movses').

195

The Historv is indeed structured as an apocalypse, starting with a status quo of

godly Roman rule and ending with the deleterious domination of the Turks and Arabs. As
suggested by that description, the view of the Turks is almost comically negative. Thus, many of
its descriptions ought to be taken with a t,>rain of salt. Furthermore, many of its most important
statements cannot be independently verified from other sources, as can be done with
Theophanes, for example. We must, then, tread carefully, and his narrative must occasionally be
interrupted with critical commentary.
The Turks first enter the story in 625/26. In that year, Heraclius, already in the Caucasus,
decided to negotiate with the Turks, and sent one Andre to meet with them and ·'satisfy the thirst
of these bestial, gold-loving tribes of hairy mcn." 196 Besides the negative animus that will mark
the source's treatment of the Turks, this earliest mention reveals one crucial point: in contrast to
the earlier diplomatic interaction, the Romans initiated contact. lndeed, these relations are
marked by a role reversal ofManiakh's embassy in 568. This time, it is the Romans who came
bearing gifts and lofty promises al the Sasanians' expense, and fortunately, the Turks proved
equally receptive as had Justin II. Movses describes how a certain "Jehu Xak'an" agreed to the
proposition with "great eagerness." 197 Clearly, this is an Armenian rendering of the title Y abghu
Khagan, the name for the ruler of the Western Turks - identified as Tong Y abghu by the Chinese
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sources.

198

By clear parallels with Theophanes' account (namely at AM 6117), we can also

establish him as the same ruler mentioned by Greek sources as "Ziebel.''
Troublesomely, Movses (and, indeed, most sources covering this period) does not
identify these northern warriors as Turks; rather, they employ the term ·'Khazars.•· Some
confusion is extant in the scholarship, and an explanation of their identification with the Turks
warrants treatment here. The Khazars are the successors of the Turks on the Pantie-Caspian
steppes, occupying much of their fonner role as trade intermediary and third great power in
Western Eurasia. As such, many early references, often, as Golden notes, found in Sasanian
traditions, are simple anachronisms owing to the sources' later origins. 199 Certainly, the presence
of the Khazars looms large over our sources, evinced by the fact that the composition of the

History o/682 was likely interrupted by a Khazar invasion in 685. 200 It is thus an understandable
temptation for later writers to conflate them with earlier invasions.
However, it is not necessary to discount the identification entirely. After all, Khazar
origins are exceedingly mysterious as they ostensibly appear ex nihilo after the collapse of the
Western Khaganate, with only al-Masudi explaining them as a transfonnation of the Sabirs. 201 It
is thus far from an impossibility that the Khazars existed as a subtribe within the confederation of
the Turks, and owing to simple geography, it would make sense for them to be the main force of
the invading army. Such a reading may find support in the fact that Movses does not refer to
Tong Yabghu as ''King of the Khazars," but as "the king in the north," to whom the Khazars arc
subjects. As already demonstrated in Tourxanthos, the Turkic state was more than capable of
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coordinating foreign affairs with local rulers. Provisionally, we can thus say that these were
Khazars, just operating under the broader umbrella of the Turks and Tong Yabghu.
Whatever the specifics of their identity, these Turks were ready to accept the alliance
with the Romans, despite the fact that it was they who had caused it to dissolve in the first place.
The change requires some explanation. The most obvious shift was a simple generational one.
On the one hand, Heraclius and the Romans were willing to reapproach the Turkic alliance for
fairly obvious reasons - they had few options left. But so too had the Turks' circumstances
changed drastically. Tardush disappears from the historical record after a revolt in 603,
succeeded by the rather insignificant Niri and Sheguy. 202 The year 618 marks the accession of
the altogether more interesting Tong Yabghu Khagan, who would negotiate the alliance with
Heraclius. Tong Yabghu's reign was marked by an ambition not seen since Tardush and ending
in a similar disaster. He is remembered rather poorly in the Chinese sources, as a ruler who
neglected his own people in favor of foolhardy expansion and warfare; most modem historians
have concurred. 203 But for the Romans, this was perfect. His desire for expansion was targeted
especially at the Sasanians, and he had apparently either forgotten or chosen to ignore the
negative animus ofTardush and Tourxanthos.
It is particularly telling that the authors do not mention the previous alliance, as one

might expect. If one had solely read these seventh century sources, one would not know that
there had ever been a previous alliance with the Turks. lt is unlikely that this silence reflects a
lack of knowledge - after all, Theophanes does mention the earlier alliance as an important
factor in his chronography of 571/72. 204 Rather, it would seem that the lack of mention is an
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editorial choice, reflective of the prior alliance's lack of relevance to the current one. Support for
this theory can be found in the fact that, according to Movses, the Sasanians did refer to their
now quite distant alliance with the Turks in a bid to stop their attacks. 205 But we have no
indication that Heraclius did. Given the fact that Khusro·s attempt failed drastically, it may well
have been wise to judiciously avoid relying on those prior ties.
However, there is evidence to suggest that the Romans had learned from their mistakes.
Nikcphoros, in his Short History, provides an all-important supplement to the alliance
negotiations~ a diplomatic marriage. According to him, fleraclius' daughter Eudokia was
wedded to Tong Yabghu at the confirmation of the alliance. 206 At least one author has suggested
that this represents an interpolation from a later romance tradition 207 (we have already seen the
appeal of this foreign marriage motif in the Shahnameh). Skepticism is valid, but there is little to
suggest that the marriage did not happen, and indeed, the much later Chronicle to 1234, which
draws on separate Eastern sources, also mentions the marriage. 208 If indeed it is true, it evinces
the desperation of the Roman position (one can contrast the horror, particularly in the east, at the
prospect of Attila marrying a daughter of the emperor209 ). But for the Turks, diplomatic marriage
was standard policy, as seen with the Sasanians and the Wei. In his appeal to Tong Yabghu,
Khusro emphasizes that '"we were allied with each other through our sons and daughtcrs." 210 It is
certainly striking that the most successful alliance with the Romans had this unique, important
attribute.
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Alliance secured, the Turks launched a major push into Caucasian Albania, smashing
through the Derbent Pass. This army was under the command of Tong Yabghu's "nephew,
whom they call Sat' in honor of his princely rank." 211 This is a clear rendering of the wellattested title of shad, and, as we have seen with Tourxanthos, a familial relationship is perfectly
reasonable. This anny launched devastating raids throughout the region and made camp on the
Araxes (within striking distance of the highlands) and dispatched an ultimatum to Khusro,
demanding his surrender and return of Roman lands, lest he should be destroyed. Khusro sent a
reply attempting to denigrate the position of Heraclius, but this failed to persuade them, and they
proceeded to meet with Roman forces. Apparently, the Turks withdrew shortly thereafter,
returning the next year, now led personally by Tong Yabghu to besiege Tiflis (modern Tbilisi). 212
The precise timing here is unclear. Theophanes dates these events to 624, which would
render the entire chronology of Movses incorrect. But considering Thcophanes· clear willingness
to play fast and loose with his chronology, 213 the otherwise impressively accurate History 0(682
ought to be trusted over him. Unfortunately, the order of the History here is very confused,
probably at the hands of a later editor, maybe Movses himself.2 14 Close reading, can, however,
reconstruct the true order.
The History places the siege ofTiflis in the thirty-eighth regnal year ofKhusro, i.e.,
somewhere between June 627 and Khusro's murder on February 24 or 25 628. 215 This means that
Tong Yabghu arrived after the initial invasion dated 626/27, led by his dispatched shad-Movses
even describes a scene of Tong Yabghu choosing to lead personally upon his seeing the
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splendiferous loot.

216

Thus, there were probably two separate invasions, a theory supported by

the withdrawal of the Turks that is placed before the arrival of Tong Yabghu. 217 Given that the
first invasion likely withdrew sometime during 626 (since it began immediately after the
embassy of 625/26), it could be that Heraclius· relief of Constantinople was what interrupted the
campaign. It is the later invasion whose "universal wrath" is so strikingly remembered in the
eyewitness account given in Movses. 218 The description of their depredations clearly shows signs
of the apocalypticism proposed by the preface of the History of 682, but it nevertheless
demonstrates just how strongly it remained in the minds of the Albanians.
Their return marks another difference from Justin's handling of the alliance: Hcraclius
personally met with Tong Yabghu. Upon meeting him at Tillis, Tong Yabghu apparently made a
major show of deference to Heraclius by dismounting before him, reported in both Theophancs
and Nikephoros as a symbol of Roman superiority. 219 Theophanes stops here, but Nikephoros,
relying on his sources privy to court politics, 220 describes the theatrical diplomacy here in
considerable detail. It is here that he reports the betrothal of Eudokia and Tong Yabghu, and the
further step of Heraclius' declaring Tong Yabghu his son. In addition, he invited him to remount
his horse, bestowed imperial robes and pearls upon both Tong Y abghu and his entourage, and
crowned him with an imperial crown. 221 As Howard-Johnston notes, these actions arc
extraordinary, and give Tong Yabghu a near-equality with the cmperor222
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language was reserved for the Sasanians, begrudgingly acknowledged as equals by the
Romans.

223

To elevate the Turks to this level of prestige is quite radical, although justified by

their military strength. The acknowledgement of the Turks as an equal empire stands in direct
contrast to Justin's characteristically more dismissive attitude - in the time ofHeraclius, the
Turks were truly allies, not pawns. That is the single largest point of distinction, and key to
understanding why this later alliance succeeded.
And succeed it did, despite minor setbacks. The siege ofTiflis was relieved by Sasanian
forces and the Turks and Romans abandoned the siege. But this was a strategic withdrawal more
than a retreat. Again, we have a disparity between sources as to what happens next. Movses has
the Turks returning home after this siege, but Theophanes reports that the Turks joined on an
invasion of Atropatene, leaving only in winter. 224 Given the selectiveness of Movses, and the fact
that the reason for the Turks' leaving is their inability to help in Heraclius' invasion of
Mesopotamia, which happens after the attack on Atropatene, Theophanes is probably correct
here, and Movses has simply elided it. The Sasanians were defeated in this area, and after the
Turks had left, Heraclius was free to march into Mesopotamia, fighting the Battle of Nineveh
and camping outside Ctesiphon. 225 By the return of the Turks next year, a conspiracy had
assassinated Khusro and peace was being negotiated between the Romans and Sasanians.
In many ways, this was Justin II and lshtemi's dream realized, a joint Turco-Roman
assault defeating the Sasanians. There was, however, one crucial difference. Far from the twofront pincer movement Menander portrays as Justin's aim, the successful defeat of Persia came
through a coordinated assault in Albania. The evidence does not necessarily suggest that this was
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due to a Turkic inability to attack from the East. Just twenty years prior, a Turkic raiding army,
operating alongside an allied Hephthalite rump state, had penetrated as far as Isfahan, according
to Sebcos. 226 This army was defeated by Smbat IV Bagratuni, but the fact remains that invasion
of Iran from the East was possible, particularly while Khusro was distracted by his western front.
So why attack Transcaucasia?
Practically speaking, this was likely the best option on the table. The sources
unanimously emphasize that this was a coordinated campaign, with the Turkic invasion being
perfectly timed with the movement ofHeraclius' troops. Even Movses (or the History 0(682),
who is friendly to Heraclius but hostile to the Turks, admits that the two were acting in concert.
Given the sheer distances involved, it is unlikely that any such coordination could have occurred
between the two fronts.22 7 What is more, there seems to have been an available Turkic anny
ready to move into Transcaucasia almost immediately- by the chronological reading proposed
above, the first Turkic invasion occurred rather shortly after the agreement of an alliance.
Movses suggests that the alliance with the Turks was a surprise attack, 228 which would make
time even more of the essence. Certainly, the strike was quick enough to preclude any Sasanian
response to halt it. These sorts of bold surprise attacks were a hallmark of Heraclius' campaigns,
as shown by his movement north to relieve the siege of Constantinople229 and his later attack on
Atropatene in winter. 230
So too were there very good strategic reasons for focusing on Transcaucasia. In analyzing
the Persian campaign of Heraclius, Howard-Johnston makes a brilliant point that bears repetition
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here. By seizing Transcaucasia, the Turks and Heraclius had opened up and threatened the
central Iranian highlands - lands ultimately more important to the ruling classes of the Empire
than Mesopotamia, the traditional target of Roman attacks. 231 It can also be added that control of
the Araxes would threaten Persannenia, which served as the main staging ground for Sasanian
invasions into Roman territory. 232 In one fell swoop, then, Heraclius and the Turks had
threatened the very heart of the Sasanians and deprived them of their means of fighting back.
The degree to which this was a conscious decision is, of course, unknowable. Given the
importance Heraclius placed on securing allegiances in the region, it is a fair assumption that he
understood some of its strategic value. 233 Tong Yabghu's strategy is much more difficult to
reconstruct, although his personal presence south of Caucasus is certainly suggestive of an
interest in the region.
Regardless of Heraclius and Tong Yagbhu's perception of that strategic value, it worked.
The murder ofKhusro was fomented by the very same aristocratic families threatened by the
Turco-Romans on the Iranian Plateau - as much is stated by our best sources on Iran, Scbeos and
al-TabarI. 234 As is their wont, the sources primarily ascribe varying, overly personal motivations
for this coup, but Parvaneh Pourshariati has convincingly merged these accounts into a
comprehensible reading that supports her broader thesis of the influence ofSasanian-Pa1ihian
noble families. The precise details need not detain us; it suffices to say that a number ofthcse
families (mainly the Ispahbudhan, Bagratuni, and Nimruzi), with power bases on the Iranian
Plateau and Armenian highlands, conspired to overthrow Khusro, beginning with Zad Farrukh' s
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rebellion c. 626/27, apparently before the "climactic" Battle ofNineveh. 235 Certainly, this built
on the centuries of tensions so masterfully outlined in the rest of her volume. However,
Pourshariati has overlooked the immediate trigger.
A surface reading can show that the most substantial change in the war at this point was
the entry of the Turks into Albania, and by syllogism alone causation may be ascribed. But we
can go further. Two of the parties most complicit in the immediate coup 236 were those most
directly imperiled by the Turkic invasions. The Ispahbudhan under Zad Farrukh, were based in
Atropatene (Azarbayjan) 237 which, as we have seen, was being attacked by Turco-Roman forces.
Varaztirots' Bagratuni (son of the Smbat who had fought the earlier Turkic invasion), ruling in
Armenia, was also in the direct path of the Turks, as their later invasion confirms. Given the
paucity of sources, this reading can only be taken so far, and the Nimruzi, based in Sistan were
apparently motivated by Khusro's turn against their leader Mardanshah. 238 But the Turks are a
common denominator here, and, by compromising the security of their domains, likely played a
central motivating role in the nobles' coup, and therefore the surrender of the Sasanians.
The exact peace treaty at the end of the war does not survive. A Mcnander-csque account
may well have been preserved in the official history of the campaign written by George of
Pisidia, but none of our extant sources reproduce it. 239 Certainly. it specified the return of the
formerly Roman provinces occupied by the Sasanians, but almost universally (likely following
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Heraclius' lead, given his later pageantry), the sources are far more concerned with the return of
the True Cross than any political ramifications on the Romans' eastern frontier. 240 Specifics are
thus difficult to come by. However, we can draw broad narrative strokes of the negotiations.
Immediately after the murder of Khusro, his son and successor Kavad sent a letter, allegedly
preserved in the Chronicon Paschale, suing for peace. 241 However, Shahrvaraz, leader of the
occupying Sasanian anny now stationed in Alexandria, refused to abide by the truce.
Heraclius thus began negotiations with Shahrvaraz - negotiations which would result in
an alliance between emperor and ambitious general. Heraclius could thereby ensure the removal
of the occupying anny without undue bloodshed and Shahrvaraz could use Roman forces to
defeat his enemies in Ctesiphon. 242 Nikephoros again mentions a marriage alliance, this time
between the daughter ofShahrvaraz and Heraclius' son; Shahrvaraz's (Christian) son was also
made a patrician. 243 A further addition is found in the Syriac Chronicle o/724, not without
problems, but still invaluable and generally trustworthy. 244 The anonymous chronicler claims
that the Euphrates was the agreed upon boundary between the Romans and Sasanians. 245 Some
historians have rejected this, seeing it as impossibly conciliatory, given Heraclius' position of
power.
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However, Howard-Johnston's argument, which posits that Shahrvaraz simply could

not politically afford giving these lands to the Romans, is most convincing. 247 It might also be
added that Shahrvaraz was in a particularly precarious position owing to his being from outside
the House of Sasan - a fact which rendered him inherently illegitimate. 248
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Despite, or perhaps because of, his illegitimacy, Heraclius was clearly willing to go to
significant lengths to ensure the success of his new ally. Indeed, he sent a great number of troops
to his aid in subduing the forces of Ardashir 111. 249 Taken together, it appears as though the peace
with the Sasanians was not a punitive measure so much as a decisive end to the conflict. Much
like the Treaty of 562, the Romans were willing to make territorial and imperial concessions to
ensure the continued security of the east. Indeed, according to the often-hyperbolic Chronicon
Pascha/e, Heraclius had made repeated attempts at peace, even at the expense of becoming a
tributary state of the Sasanians. 250 Likely, this is an exaggeration, but it seems to strike a true
note of his commitment to ending the war.
for all that we do not know about the Romans' peace with the Sasanians, the Turks' is
obscurer by several orders of magnitude; in fact, it is entirely unclear if there was one. There is
no indication that they were present at the negotiations, either with Kavad or Shahrvaraz. Most
of the major sources cease mentioning them after 628, save, again, Movses Kagankatvac'i.
Movses paints a picture of continued Turkic occupation of Albania. The new shad led a number
of expeditions throughout Transcaucasia, including the successful siege of Ti fl is. Curiously,
Movses dates these attacks to 629, ostensibly after the Romans had negotiated a truce. His
chronology can be off, but there is no reason to question him here. This could well indicate that
whatever settlement was reached by the Romans did not apply to the Turks. Clearly, however,
the Turks had set up shop in Albania, as is indicated by the rather lengthy interlude where Viroy
visits the shad and reaches a modus vivendi between occupiers and Albanians. 251 Further
establishing a post-truce dating, Movses relates an attempt by the newly crowned Shahrvaraz to
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stop the Turkic expansion in the region. However, atier a classic Parthian feint by the Turks, his
atmy was utterly crushed and their horses mockingly disfigured. 252 Thence, the Turks were free
to "[advance] through the passes of the three kingdoms of Armenia, Georgia, and Albania." 253
Only the collapse of the K.haganate repulsed these invaders.

It has been the tendency in scholarship to divide the continuing Turkic warfare from the
Roman settlement with the Sasanians, even proposing that the Turks were breaking with imperial
policy. 254 At most, Howard-Johnston has proposed that part of the agreement with Shahrvaraz
was giving him "a free hand to deal with the Turks." 255 However, the presence of the Turks can,
in fact, be squared with Heraclius' policy. His main goal was indeed peace, but it was peace for
the Romans. That goal is rather well-served by continuing warfare in Persia. The Turks provided
a wonderful distraction for the Sasanians, and their occupation of Transcaucasia prevented a
Sasanian attack on Roman territory. After all, the ostensible agreement of a Euphrates boundary
did put the Sasanians within striking distance of Antioch and the Roman East. 256 The continual
presence of the Turks in Transcaucasia could serve as an effective counterweight - the forces of
the Turks hanging like a Sword of Damocles over any attempt to move south of them. Thus, the
Turkic occupation of Albania and expansion into Persarmenia may have given Hcraclius the
confidence to make these terms.
Through his alliance with the Turks, Heraclius had managed to transform the darkest
moment of Roman history into an age of tremendous promise. By 630, the Roman position of
superiority was now firmly established over the Near East. On the other hand, the Turks had
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been handed the keys to the kingdom of Albania and had a clear route of expansion in
Transcaucasia. Times were rarely better for the allies. With the benefit of hindsight, the irony is
palpable. In fact, the settlement so carefully constructed was a paper tiger, a fact which would
soon be cast into high relief by the invasions of two new empires: the Muslims and the Tang.
But, as with the treaty of 562, knowledge of this period's end should not lead us to discount its
importance. Even without the coming of Islam and Tang imperialism, the three main players had
been fundamentally changed by this last great war of antiquity, and the Turco-Roman alliance
was directly at its epicenter.
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Section Six: Tang Invasion, Islamic Conquests, and the End of the First Khaganatc
The ultimate end of the Turco-Roman alliance came neither from the Turks nor the
Romans. It came from the total redefinition of Eurasian dynamic, spurred by two great imperial
conquests on either side of Asia - the early Islamic conquests and the expansion of Tang China.
The Turkic Empire, both east and west, collapsed entirely, falling into disorganization and Tang
hegemony. So too does this mark the end of the Sasanians, the great enemy of the alliance. While
the Romans did not vanish, the amputation of its wealthiest provinces resulted in a redefinition of
their empire into one that is fundamentally outside that which is presented here. The present
examination shall make no attempt to detail the elusive and controversial early Islamic conquests
nor the better-documented Tang expansion. Rather, it will explain in detail how these events
ended Turco-Roman cooperation and examine the lasting impact of the alliance on this pivotal
period.
The first hints of the corning collapse came not from the west, but from the cast. Owing
to the nature of the present discussion, little attention has hitherto been paid to the changes in
China and the Eastern Khaganatc. A short, context-providing retrospective is thus in order. As a
direct response to the depredations of the Turks, China had witnessed a realignment of their
political system, first under the Sui dynasty and, after their collapse, the Tang. These new
dynasties were led by aristocratic families of the Northern frontier and had thus deemphasized
the Confucian values of the earlier Han dynasty in favor of a more heavily militarized, steppe
nomad-like political systcrn.' 57 This blend was not new, but its control over a united China was.
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At first, the Eastern Turks were all too happy to raid and profit from the instability the
establishments of the Sui and Tang caused. However, after the consolidation of Tang control, an
equally powerful empire was on their southern frontier; the Eastern Turks, racked by civil war,
were conquered by Emperor Taizong (who proclaimed himself the "'heavenly khagan") in 629. 258
For all that scholars have often tried to distance the Western Khaganate from the Eastern,
their histories proved to be inextricably entwined in this period. Tong Yabghu seems to have
maintained friendly relations with the Tang, being potentially complicit in their conquest of the
East (or at least enabled it via inaction). It is perhaps easy to see why: with their removal, Tong
Yabghu was ostensibly the unchallenged master of the steppes. But as we have seen, Movscs
reports the withdrawal of Turkic forces from Transcaucasia shortly after Shahrvaraz' accession,
most likely placing it in 630. 259 The ''brigands" that Movses mentions seem to refer to the revolt
that swept through Tong Yabghu's realm, reported in the Chinese sources. 260 In a rare
concordance, Movses and the Old Tang Annals both ascribe the collapse of Tong Yabghu's reign
to his overambitious expansionism and neglect of his own people. 261 After all, his reign had seen
a major expansion of Turkic power, including a push past the Khyber Pass into Gandhara. 262
But nowhere is his expansion better documented than in the Caucasus, pa1iicularly in
Albania. Geographically speaking, steppe nomads taking an interest in the plains of Albania is
hardly surprising, given its suitability to pastoral nomadism; a similar interest would result in its
settlement by Turks under the Seljuqs, thereby leading to modem, Turkic-speaking Azerbaijanis.
And, as evinced by Movses' preservation ofCatholicos Viroy's account, the Turks were in
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Albania to stay. Movscs has the Turks, under his unnamed shad, issue an ultimatum demanding
submission from the Albanians and when they do not receive a reply, the Turks begin to ravage
the countryside. lt was only through the sage efforts ofViroy (compared directly to Moses in
delivering his people263 ) that the Albanians supplicate themselves to the Turks and reach a modus

vivendi. Clearly, this is an account ripe for self-serving manipulation (part of the narration is in
the first person), and, given the general anti-Turk animus of the Chronicle into which it was
inserted, their savagery may well be exaggerated.
More interesting is the quite generous accommodation reached between the Turks and
Albanians. The dissimilarity of Turkic reasonableness displayed here contrasts sharply with their
portrayal in the rest of the work, which may itself indicate its historicity. Furthennore, Movses
describes the presence of tuduns, 264 a well-attested Turkic title for a tax collector. 265 And as the
presence of tax collectors suggests, this seems to have been a permanent incorporation into the
Khaganate. Indeed, as a reparation to the country that he had despoiled, the shad offers to "'repay
you twofold in man and beast,'' on the condition that he can "rest [his J army within your
borders. " 266 He goes on to respect the Lenten fast and offer the Albanians bread in place of meat
at the feast confirming their submission. It is far from shocking that this would be negotiated
with the local Catholicos, and the respect that the shad shows likely indicates an attempt to fold
him into Turkic administration.
If the Chinese sources are to be believed, the flip side to this expansion into settled areas
was a neglect of the nomadic subjects who served as the core of his empire. 267 Given the extreme
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paucity of corroborating evidence, this cannot be coniinned, but we have no reason to disbelieve
it. Apparently dissatisfied, the Karluks (a subject tribe) launched an open rebellion, and much
like Khusro II, Tong Yabghu was assassinated by other, presumably sympathetic elements in his
capital. Thence came a spiral of ephemeral khagans and the complete collapse of central
khaganal authority. A number of subject tribes broke off altogether, including the Khazars on the
Pantie-Caspian Steppe. Those who stayed reorganized into a much looser, bipolar confederacy
known as the On Oq (ten arrows), which was steadily picked at by the Tang for the remainder of
the century.
The Roman alliance was clearly an enabler of the expansionist policies of Tong Yabghu,
and thus contributed directly to the collapse of his rule. However, the Tang role in the collapse of
the Western Khaganatc ought not be understated. The fonnal conquest of the west was much,
much slower than the sudden overthrow of the Eastern Khaganate, stretching out over a halfcentury and remaining partially incomplete at the rise of the Second Turkic Khaganatc inc.
682. 268 But their influence was felt long before. The Chinese sources imply that many of the
Turkic tribes not incorporated into the Tang administration fled west, presumably moving into
Tong Yabghu's land and under his control. 269 Doubtless this was a destabilizing factor in a
system already straining under the pressure of expansionism and an unbalanced nomad/settled
equilibrium. In line with traditional steppe policy, the Tang also supported many rebel groups
that arose after Tong Yabghu' s assassination, furthering its decline. 270
In any case, the collapse of the Turks had left the Romans without a potential ally in the
coming conflict with the new power of Islam. The ever-controversial details of the early Islamic
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conquests cannot be fully examined here. 271 It can at least be said that by 1-!eraclius' death in
641, the Romans (or now, if one prefers, Byzantines) had lost their territories south of the Taurus
to the Muslims. In explaining the Romans' loss to the Muslims, Walter Kaegi aptly describes
them as "not in a state of collapse,'' but ''fiscally, psychologically, and militarily unstable and
potentially volatile." 272 The Muslims arrived precisely at a moment of Roman vulnerability after
the peace agreement with the Sasanians. However, many of the mistakes and insufficiencies in
the defensive policies, most notably an unwillingness to leave fortifications and gain initiative,
were visible much earlier, notably in the Persian invasions in the 61 Os. 273 These weaknesses of
the Roman military system were compensated for by the Turks in the last great war of antiquity,
but without their assistance, those weaknesses were laid bare before the Muslim armies.
But recent events did play a role in the weakness of the Romans in the face of the Muslim
invasion. After his Turk-assisted victory, Heraclius felt much freer to demobilize his forces,
reducing the size of the army ready to face the imminent Muslim invasion. 274 So too had the
massive ceremonial of the True Cross's return proved an incredible expense for a Roman
financial apparatus already reeling. 275 Heraclius can hardly be condemned for his lack of
omniscience - there was, after all, no reason to believe that a new major threat would appear in
the East. Regardless, these policies did contribute to Roman unreadiness to face Muslim annies.
Again, the alliance with the Turks allowed 1-!eraclius to claim a military victory despite

271 Though an admittedly sanguine reading of the available evidence (and by now quite old), the standard base
narrative of the conquests remains Fred M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1981); the best account from a Roman perspective is Walter E. Kaegi, Byzantium and the Ear~v Islamic

Conquests (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); from the Sasanian is Pourshariati, Decline and Fall.
161-281; all contain vital appraisals of sources and relevant bibliographies.
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fundamental, systemic issues at the heart of his empire. That victory allowed for the pursuit of
policies which would prove detrimental in the coming years.
Furthermore. the Turks' invasion and brief occupation of Sasanian territory had a
deleterious effect on their resistance to Muslim armies. The timing here is even more difficult to
establish here than in the Roman empire, and the challenge to the consensus by Pourshariati
(who places the initial Muslim conquest contemporary with the Byzantine renewal) has thrown
the whole affair into disarray. 276 If Pourshariati is correct, this would place the Turkic attacks in
Transcaucasia as similarly contemporary. In any case, according to Movses, by the time the
Sasanian forces from Albania and Transcaucasia were called to anns, the Turks were gone. 277
But the Turks' influence would continue to be felt long after. If the Turkic conquest was even
half as apocalyptic as Movses portrays, it would be reasonable to suggest that Transcaucasia's
military power was somewhat sapped. Most importantly, the break between various noble
families spurred on by the Turkic incursion proved to be a decisive factor in the Sasanian's
defeat - and indeed their greatest victory was a rare occasion where they managed to work
together. 278 Regardless of dating, Turkic influence was felt during the Islamic conquests.
Does that mean that the Turco-Roman alliance and its collapse caused the early Islamic
conquests? Of course not. Monocausality, always an oversimplification, ought to be wholly
disregarded in the case of the Islamic conquests, where the extant evidence arguably does not
give enough information to draw even fallacious conclusions. Nor does everything in the early
seventh century need to be twisted and manipulated into a teleological ramp-up to the most
significant event therein. Explaining the Islamic conquests is rather a process of illuminating
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some of the innumerable contingencies which contributed to its success. And the Turkic alliance
is one of those contingencies, as is its collapse. Indeed, as we have seen, it may well have been a
very important one. Perhaps the most illustrative approach, if appropriate, is to imagine an
alternative hypothetical in which the Turks had never joined the Romans in invading Persia, or
one in which they had remained in Transcaucasia during the climactic fighting. Both cases would
assuredly alter the course of the conquests.
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Conclusion
Just as we began with Movses' account of the Turkic attack, so too shall we conclude
with it. Movses most likely compiled the final version of his history some time near the end of
the tenth century, long after the collapse of the Western Khaganatc. 279 Even the original historian
of 682 was apparently far enough from the Turks to remember them solely as Khazars. Y ct they
both chose to devote substantive portions of their work to the history of the Turks in Albania,
because it was impossible to fully recount their histories without it. That suggests something
which has become exceedingly apparent over the course of this analysis: the importance of
Turco-Roman relations to the events of the late sixth and early seventh centuries. Most notably,
the Turks lay directly at the epicenter of the collapse of Justinian's peace with the Sasanians and
the final victory over them, their influence bookending the period.
Thus, the Turco-Roman alliance finds its place as a crucial part of the final century of
antiquity. But even without that pivotal role, the Turco-Roman alliance provides much insight.
Analysis of the (comparatively) well-documented alliance with the Romans allows for the best
glimpse at the goals and motivations of the Turks, particularly the peculiar and evasive Western
Khaganate. In addition, it charts an evolution of Roman foreign policy, from one which was
derisive and dismissive of the Turks to one in which they were treated as equals. Bridging the
vast differences in government and culture, the Turks and Romans found a middle ground, where
Romans could participate in Turkic institutions and, eventually, Turks in Roman ones. The
alliance was perhaps a victim of its own success -having created for itself the very conditions
for its downfall. However, that hardly means that it failed, or that it had no lasting impact to be
accounted for.
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Further, a careful reconstruction of Turco-Roman relations opens a number of exciting
possibilities for future research. An examination of cultural factors, such as the Turks' and
Romans' perceptions of each other, might be reconstructed in parallel to the political narrative.
Equally illuminating would be this narrative's integration into a broader synthesis including
either Rome's earlier contacts with Inner Asian steppe nomads, later contacts with Turkic
successor states, or both. The preceding investigation has concentrated on the Romans' evolving
relationship with the Turkic Khaganate, mentioning events in the Sasanian world only when
relevant to Rome. However, there is a possibility of reconstructing Turco-Sasanian relationship
more precisely with the knowledge gained from examining its events as reflected in the Roman
sphere. By that same token, a study taken more completely from an Inner Asian point of view
may find an increased role for the Roman alliance in understanding the Turks' internal history.
Comparative studies with the more heavily studied relationship between the Turks and China
will also be illuminating.
Ifthere is a single theme that ought to emerge in continuing scholarship, it is a further
integration between the often-separate historiographies surrounding the settled Near Eastern
world and the Inner Asian steppe peoples. For the most part, scholars of the Near East have been
content either to ignore Inner Asia entirely, or at best have relied on broad-strokes syntheses
rather than fully engaging with the vibrant body of scholarship. Obviously, the rigors of
discipline and the limitations of human beings somewhat moderate the ability of scholars to
easily travel between these worlds. However, if the preceding work has demonstrated anything, it
is that a closer integration is not only fruitful, but necessary for fully understanding the events in
the Near East.

Melvin 83
Most importantly, this examination has allowed the First Turkic Khaganate to emerge as
a powerful political force in the Near East. Throughout the surveyed period, they have clearly
demonstrated their agency in their relationship with the Romans; they remained strikingly
consistent in goals and aims and possessed the means of accomplishing them. It is hardly a
coincidence that, in covering the Turco-Roman alliance, it has been necessary to mention most of
the most significant events of the period. Why9 Because those events are intertwined with the
actions of the Turks in general and the Turco-Roman alliance in particular. That strikes back at
the Roman-centric, Iran-centric, and anti-nomadic biases which have often relegated it to a
tertiary role. Those biases emerge naturally from the sources, but a careful reading thereof has
demonstrated the insufficiency of that model. Even the Romans themselves, so dismissive of the
Turks in the beginning, were compelled to acknowledge a parity between the two empires in the
time ofHeraclius. In moving forward with the study of the Late Antique Near East, it is time for
scholars to do the same.
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